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ABSTRACT 
Several new organizational health care delivery forms have developed in recent 
decades. For hospital services, the number of single specialty hospitals (SSHs) providing 
cardiac and orthopedic/surgical services has grown significantly. Physician-owners claim 
that these SSHs use limited-scope and economies of scale to provide higher quality of 
care and reduce costs. While SSH costs have been studied, a comprehensive assessment 
of SSH quality of care and an evaluation of factors affecting SSH location is useful. For 
primary care services, significant growth in the number of retail health clinics (RHCs) 
has employed nurse practitioners (NPs) to provide care for a limited set of low-acuity 
conditions. Whether state regulations limiting the ability of NPs to practice independently 
affect RHC location is not known. 
To assess whether SSHs provide higher quality of care than competing general 
hospitals, we compared process of care and outcome measures for SSHs and general 
hospitals in the same health care market for 2008 through 2011. Cardiac SSHs had better 
scores for some outcomes. All SSHs had some better and some worse process of care 
scores, although scores for all hospitals increased over time and differences between 
SSHs and general hospitals diminished. Any improvements in quality of care were not 
v 
robust to other factors. To evaluate the economic factors affecting hospital service 
specialization, we used ordered logistic regression to model presence of an SSH or 
ambulatory surgery center (ASC) on supply, demand, and regulatory factors. A higher 
degree of hospital specialization is associated with higher population levels and growth, 
more specialists and operating rooms per capita, and the absence of certificate of need 
laws. To assess economic factors affecting RHC location and test whether regulations 
limiting NP practice autonomy affect RHC location, we used logistic regression to model 
presence of an RHC on relevant economic factors and state regulations limiting NP 
practice autonomy. RHC location is associated with higher private insurance levels and 
certain factors affecting primary care supply, but is unhindered by regulations limiting 
NP practice autonomy. Each new form of in health care delivery examined appears 
uniquely affected by geographic differences in supply, demand, and regulatory factors. 
Vl 
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1. Quality of Care Differences between Single Specialty and General Hospitals Have 
Diminished Over Time 
Introduction 
The number of physician-owned cardiac and orthopedic/surgical single specialty 
hospitals (SSHs) has increased substantially in recent years. The growth in SSHs has 
highlighted certain innovations in hospital service provision that SSHs have introduced in 
an attempt to maximize profits and quality. These innovations stem from the SSH model 
which focuses on specialization through a limited-scope and sometimes large-scale of 
services. Proponents claim that this business model increases the quality and reduces the 
average cost of the hospital services provided. While recent legislation has limited future 
growth in physician-owned specialty hospitals, evaluating the effectiveness of SSH 
innovations is important for assessing whether the provision of certain hospital services 
can be improved through the economies of scale and scope that SSHs strive to achieve. 
Physician-owners claim that SSH innovations in limited services and physician 
management have focused on increasing quality of care by improving skill through 
repetition, limiting the services on which surgeons and staff develop such skills, 
decreasing disruptions in the operating room, and standardizing the use of medical 
supplies and devices. Furthermore, physician-owners claim that these innovations have 
reduced costs by decreasing delays in operating room scheduling, decreasing turn around 
time from one surgery to the next in each operating room, increasing the productivity of 
surgeons by working between two operating rooms, controlling hospital staff more 
directly, streamlining medical device and supply contracts, and reducing the length of a 
patient's stay.1 However, critics claim that physician-ownership of SSHs results in 
adverse selection of patients 2 and referral practices that lead to overutilization.3•4•5 
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While SSHs provide certain hospital services in a new and innovative manner, 
SSH specialization has not reduced costs. In 2006, the Medicare Payment Advisory 
Commission (MedPAC) stated that compared to competitor community hospitals in 
2002, cardiac SSH costs were comparable and orthopedic/surgical SSH costs were about 
20 percent higher based on severity-adjusted discharges.6 Carey, Burgess, and Young 
(2008) found that SSHs do not exhibit cost efficiency compared to the full service 
hospital competitors.7 In fact, orthopedic/surgical hospitals have higher levels of cost 
inefficiency, while cardiac hospitals have levels of cost inefficiency that are not 
significantly different from full-service competitor hospitals. Carey, Burgess, and Young 
(2014) reinforce the lack of cost reductions in orthopedic/surgical SSHs by finding that 
no efficiencies result from economies of scale or scope. 8 
Whether SSHs' form of specialization in hospital services has improved quality of 
care is less certain. Several early studies of SSH outcomes suggest there may be quality 
improvements linked to this type of ownership. Dobson et al. (2003) found slightly lower 
risk adjusted mortality rates and lengths of stay for patients treated at MedCath heart 
hospitals in 2001.9 Greenwald et al. (2006) compared groups of 2003 Medicare claims 
stratified by severity and found lower mortality and readmission rates for orthopedic 
SSHs, and lower mortality and higher readmission rates for cardiac SSHs.10 Nallamouthu 
et al. (2007) found that cardiac SSHs treated lower-risk patients compared to general 
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hospitals and had modestly better risk-standardized mortality rates based on 2003 
Medicare claims. 11 Theses comparisons of SSHs to general hospitals assessed a limited 
number of outcome measures by using early data. This chapter provides a comprehensive 
comparison using previously unexamined process of care and refined outcomes measures 
that are available for more recent years in Medicare's Hospital Compare database. 
Background 
SSHs focus on a limited set of cardiac, orthopedic, or general surgical services, 
and are generally owned, at least in part, by physicians who refer their patients to their 
facility. Compared to orthopedic/surgical SSHs, cardiac SSHs offer a smaller set of 
services, treat a larger volume of patients, and focus more on Medicare patients. 
Orthopedic/surgical SSHs offer a wider array of services, most of which are outpatient 
procedures. These facilities have a higher share of physician ownership, have relatively 
fewer beds, and are more commonly converted from ambulatory surgery centers to 
SSHs. 1•6 Debate over the ethics of self-referring patients has complicated discussions 
about their efficacy as well as the reimbursement policies set by the Centers for Medicare 
& Medicaid Services (CMS) for Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries. 
Advocates of SSHs maintain that the focused mission and dedicated resources 
used by specialty hospitals results in improved quality and reduced costs at specialty 
hospitals as well as higher quality of care compared to competing local general 
hospitals. 10•12 Opponents claim that specialty hospitals cherry-pick the most profitable 
patients, 2 which causes financial strain on local general hospitals, 13 and implement 
referral practices that lead to overutilization.3.4,S While physician-owners are more likely 
than others to refer patients to their own facility and treat a healthier population, profit 
may not be the only motive found for these patterns. 10 
MedPAC surveyed physician-owners of SSHs and found that they often set up 
specialty hospitals because of opportunities for organizational control and for increased 
income that are not available in general hospitals. Physicians in the survey commented 
heavily on frustrations with general hospital management, while general hospital 
administrators acknowledged that they were slow to react to physician issues. 1 These 
frustrations may have been exacerbated by the consolidation of hospital administrators' 
managerial authority with the implementation of CMS's inpatient prospective payment 
system in 1983. Furthermore, physicians' incentive to seek opportunities for income 
growth grew as physician income was constrained by negative updates to the Medicare 
physician fee schedule and the growth of managed care. 14 Higher payment rates for 
services when provided in a hospital made SSHs an attractive focus for development. 
One factor influencing the development of SSHs was present long before any 
significant growth in SSHs occurred. In the early 1970s states began requiring the 
approval of health care capital projects by state health planning agencies before 
development could begin. A federal law requiring such approval in all states went into 
effect in 197 4. Prior to its repeal in 1987, several states developed certificate of need 
(CON) requirements to address the federal mandate. While some states have repealed 
these requirements, 28 states currently have a CON requirement for the expansion of 
acute hospital beds, which has limited the growth of SSHs in those states. 
4 
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The fmancial incentives for physicians to set up specialty hospitals were made 
explicit through an exception to the Stark laws. In 1989, the Ethics in Patient Referrals 
Act, or Stark I, was enacted to limit physician conflicts of interest by prohibiting 
physician referrals of Medicare and Medicaid patients for clinical laboratory services if 
the physician or an immediate family member of the physician had a financial 
relationship to the entity providing the services. Enacted in 1993, Stark II expanded the 
self-referral prohibitions to a larger set of designated health services. However, the 
provisions included an exception for physician ownership of whole hospitals as physician 
ownership of short term general acute care hospitals was found to have adverse effects on 
access, cost, or use of services. The Stark laws were enacted after several studies cited 
increased utilization at physician-owned clinical laboratories, diagnostic imaging centers, 
and physical therapy centers. While investment in whole hospitals is permitted, the Stark 
laws prohibit physicians from having an ownership interest in a hospital subdivision to 
which they refer patients. Critics argue that specialty hospitals are more similar to 
hospital subdivisions than more traditional full-service hospitals, and therefore 
compromise physician ethics as physician owners may realize inappropriate financial 
gain from self-referral. 
The rapid growth of physician-owned SSHs in the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
accounting for the majority of SSHs currently operating, increased scrutiny of these 
hospitals. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 
2003 imposed an 18-month moratorium on the development of new, and the expansion of 
current, specialty hospitals beginning in December 2003. The American Medical 
6 
Association voted to oppose extension of the original moratorium, though the American 
Hospital Association and Federation of American Hospitals advocated for the 
moratorium on new specialty hospitals to become permanent.12 The moratorium, which 
prohibited new specialty hospitals from billing Medicare and prohibited current specialty 
hospitals from expanding beyond defined limits, was extended until August 8, 2006. At 
that time the Secretary of Health and Human Services, as mandated by the Deficit 
Reduction Act of 2005, issued a final report to congress with a plan to address physician 
investment in specialty hospitals. 
With the moratorium lifted, physician-owned SSHs resumed opening and 
expanding until2010, when the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 
(PPACA) added restrictions to the whole hospital exception in the Stark law. After 
December 31, 2010, only physician-owned hospitals with a provider agreement in place 
as of that date were allowed to refer Medicare patients to that hospital. Existing 
physician-owned hospitals were prohibited from increasing the percentage of physician-
ownership in the hospital or expanding the number of beds, operating rooms, and 
procedure rooms beyond the level in place on March 23, 2010. Although exceptions to 
the prohibition on expanding the number of beds, operating rooms, and procedure rooms 
may be made for hospitals based on population growth and Medicaid admissions, the law 
effectively capped the growth of physician-ownership of SSHs.i 
i The Texas Spine and Joint Hospital, joined by the trade group, Physician Hospitals of 
America (PHA), has challenged the constitutionality of the PP ACA provisions limiting 
SSH expansion. In August 2012, the lawsuit was dismissed from federal court of appeals 
7 
Framework 
Economists have long studied how specialization is capable of bringing efficiency 
to an industry. Adam Smith explained how specializing the labor involved in pin making 
into four separate operations allowed for repetition and conformity of tasks and thus 
increased output by a factor of five. 15 While he explained how specialization of labor 
could improve productivity, he also warned that specialization does not necessarily 
improve productivity and quality. Gains in productivity in Smith's pin-making example 
are attributed to increased skill resulting from repetition of each task, reduced time spent 
switching between tasks, and dedicated machinery applied to each task. 
In the health care industry, benefits from specialized labor are evident in many 
areas, especially surgery. For example, cardiac surgeons tend to focus on a few surgeries 
designed to treat blocked and constricted vessels, repair valves, or correct defects in the 
structure of the heart and major vessels. These complicated surgeries are performed more 
efficiently and with better outcomes by surgeons who have perfected the necessary skills 
and who use tools and technology developed specifically for a particular surgery. 16•17•18 
SSHs focus their mode of operation on these two goals, efficiency and high quality care, 
by focusing on repetition of a limited set of services; streamlining their operating room 
procedures and use of medical supplies and technology; and incorporating physician-
owners into hospital management and administration. What is unknown about this 
operating model is whether it can actually provide distinctly higher quality of care. 
for the fifth circuit when the court determined that the hospital and PHA would have to 
pursue their claims directly through the Department of Health and Human Services. 
Comparison with general hospitals is needed to test whether SSH's approach to hospital 
organization and management achieve a scope and scale of services that foster 
improvements in skill and efficiency, and result in improved quality of care. 
8 
Assessing whether SSHs achieve economies of scale and scope can be addressed 
by evaluating direct measures, as Carey, Burgess, and Young (2014) have done, or by 
evaluating the expected outcomes, reduced costs and quality improvements, from such 
economies of scale and scope. 8 This paper uses quality of care outcomes to test whether 
SSHs exhibit improved quality of care compared to general hospitals. Specifically, this 
paper uses recent data to compare cardiac and orthopedic/surgical SSHs with competing 
general hospitals on a comprehensive set of process of care and outcome measures from 
CMS' s Hospital Compare dataset. A confounding factor in the comparison of quality of 
care between SSHs and general hospitals is the volume of services provided at a given 
hospital. While a higher volume of services at a hospital is associated with improved 
outcomes, the effect of differences in volume is limited by using the number of services 
provided at a hospital as a weight in each of the comparisons. Nonetheless, differences in 
the average volume for the two hospital types may contribute to differences in outcomes. 
At the end of this chapter, I discuss the extent to which differences in the volume of 
services provided may explain any differences in quality of care measured in this 
analysis. 
I expect SSHs' focus on a limited set of services and innovations in organizational 
structure, streamlined procedures for staff, and scheduling efficiencies have results in 
higher quality of care compared to competing general hospitals as measured by process 
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of care and outcomes measures. In this chapter, I test this hypothesis and present results 
that provide insight into the value of SSH innovations in hospital organization and 
physician management with regard to quality of care. 
Data 
I gathered a list of 140 single-specialty hospitals (SSHs) from two main sources. 
One source of SSHs is a working list used in research conducted by Carey, Burgess, and 
Young, 8•19 and the other source is a list of SSHs identified in a 2008 department of Health 
and Human Services Office of Inspector General report.20 I reconciled the two lists of 
SSHs to generate a set of specialty hospitals that includes 25 cardiac SSHs and 115 
orthopedic/surgical SSHs that are owned at least in part by the physicians who refer 
patients to the hospital and opened prior to 2008. The SSHs included in the final list were 
still open at the time of analysis and have a confirmable zip code.ii Table 1.1 shows the 
distribution of SSHs by state. 
ii While I did not use hospital claims data to identify SSHs, I used the number of beds and 
other hospital-specific information to conclude that all hospitals analyzed were small 
hospitals with a singular focus on cardiac, orthopedic, or general surgery procedures. 
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Table 1.1 Number of Cardiac and Orthopedic/Surgical SSHs by State 
State Number of Cardiac SSHs Number of Orthopedic/Surgical SSHs 
Arkansas 1 4 
Arizona 2 5 
California 2 7 
Colorado 0 1 
Idaho 0 5 
Indiana 2 2 
Kansas 2 10 
Louisiana 3 16 
Michigan 0 1 
North Carolina 0 1 
Nebraska 1 2 
Nevada 0 1 
New Mexico 1 0 
Ohio 1 5 
Oklahoma 2 9 
Oregon 0 1 
Pennsy 1 vania 0 1 
South Dakota 1 7 
Texas 6 33 
Utah 0 2 
Wisconsin 1 2 
Total 25 115 
Quality information for these SSHs and other hospitals was downloaded from the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services' Hospital Compare database, iii which has 
information about the quality of care provided at the more than 4,000 Medicare-certified 
hospitals across the country. The database contains quality information about the 
timeliness and effectiveness of services provided as well as health care outcomes, 
specifically mortality and hospital readmission rates. Hospital Compare reports quality 
information on its database in an attempt to increase public awareness of quality of care 
iii In the database, data is available for each hospital that had at least 25 admissions that 
met the criteria for analysis for a particular measure during the data collection period. 
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and allows researchers to download datasets of hospital quality data. The two types of 
quality measures I downloaded from Hospital Compare are process of care and outcome 
measures; the latter assesses the timeliness and effectiveness of hospital care. For each 
measure, I included each hospital that had at least 25 admissions that met the criteria for 
analysis for a particular measure during the data collection period. 
Data for process of care measures are submitted by hospitals to the Abstraction & 
Reporting Tool for all types of patients-traditional Medicare, Medicare Advantage, and 
non-Medicare. Process of care measures assess whether patients receive treatments 
identified as best practices for certain common, serious medical conditions or surgical 
procedures, or how quickly hospitals treat patients who come to the hospital with certain 
medical emergencies.iv Data for these measures is collected from patients hospitalized for 
heart attack, heart failure, certain surgical procedures, as well as certain outpatient 
procedures. Values for most measures represent the percentage of patients eligible for 
assessment during a 12-month period who actually received the service or met the quality 
metric. Values for three of the outpatient measures represent the average number of 
minutes it took for a medical service or assessment to be provided to patients with a 
possible emergency, who were eligible for assessment during a 12-month period. The 
process of care measures analyzed and their availability by year are shown in Table 1.2. I 
analyzed available process of care measure data from Hospital Compare for dates of 
service for each calendar year from 2008 through 2011. These process measures provide 
iv See http://www.medicare.gov/hospitalcompare/data/ProcessOfCare/Measures.aspx for 
more information about process of care measures. 
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a reasonable assessment of how well hospitals consistently incorporate best practices into 
the services they provide. Heart attack, heart failure, and surgical procedure measures 
adequately assess the services provided at cardiac SSHs; though services provided at 
orthopedic/surgical SSHs may be assessed less completely by these outpatient and 
surgical procedure measures. 
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Table 1.2 Annual Process of Care Measures Analyzed, 2008- 2011 
Label Measure 2008 2009 2010 2011 
: ... ·. < •.•. ·.·.· .·.· •·· ···· 
.. --~;.;. IIeal'iAttack Measures-\ ····.- -.· __ ,_._ ··-.::::(_(::::· /'• .. ,·.·< ..... · ··":, ..... ···: ····: .. ··.··. ·:.:·.':)/:/;::: .. , ... .···:-;-: 
AMil Patients Given Aspirin at Arrival X X X X 
AMI2 Patients Given Aspirin at Discharge X X X X 
Patients Given Angiotensin-Converting Enzyme 
AMI3 (ACE) Inhibitor or Angiotensin Receptor Blocker X X X X 
(ARB) for Left Ventricular Systolic Dysfunction 
AMI4 Patients Given Smoking Cessation X X X X Advice/Counseling 
AMI5 Patients Given Beta Blocker at Discharge X X X X 
AMI7 Patients Given Fibrinolytic Medication Within 30 X X X X Minutes Of Arrival 
AMI8 Patients Given Percutaneous Coronary X X X X Intervention Within 90 Minutes Of Arrival 
AMilO Patients Given a Prescription for a Statin at X X Discharge 
) ...... . / <. L·. . >_· ·.:> .· .. ·.··· .· · .... _.-. ,. ········ _·• ... ·. \S\::·.::.'.: > > \ . •.· ... 
.. ;< ..·.:,··· ._:.;,.:·_. < He.attFailu,re Measures .. _ .. _..__ .•. ·: 
.. 
HFl Patients Given Discharge Instructions X X X X 
HF2 Patients Given An Evaluation of Left Ventricular X X X X Systolic Function 
HF3 Patients Given ACE Inhibitor or ARB for Left X X X X Ventricular Systolic Dysfunction 
HF4 Patients Given Smoking Cessation X X X X Advice/Counseling 
1 ·/ .: .;:, -.:• :<·,-\ • ···. < . )> X ~ '.. - <' cLc-il.li':::.. 
·- -- ~:-::: .•. · •.. -.· ... ····:···>·:·: .•• , •.•• /: •...•• ; ) <•' ,:·····-·····'····>··············· . ·········-··············:,-···:· .... ··. . ' ,,' ..... --·- .. ::·.-· ... -..... .. _ -:•. ... "'-'-"' ...... •·•· .. .. ·.. . ... : .. :• .······ ··:..-
OP 1 a Median Time to Fibrinolysis (a lower number of X X X 
minutes is better) 
Outpatients with Chest Pain or Possible Heart 
OP2 Attack Who Got Drugs to Break up Blood Clots X X X 
within 30 Minutes of Arrival (higher numbers are 
better) 
Average Number of Minutes Before Outpatients 
with Chest Pain or Possible Heart Attack Who 
OP3 a Needed Specialized Care Were Transferred to X X X 
Another Hospital (a lower number of minutes is 
better) 
OP4 Outpatients with Chest Pain or Possible Heart X X X Attack Who got Aspirin within 24 Hours of 
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Arrival (higher numbers are better) 
Average Number of Minutes Before Outpatients 
OP5 a with Chest Pain or Possible Heart Attack Got an X X X Electrocardiogram (a lower number of minutes is 
better) 
Outpatients Having Surgery Who Got an 
OP6 Antibiotic at the Right Time - within One Hour X X X 
Before Surgery (higher numbers are better) 
OP7 Outpatients Having Surgery Who Got the Right X X X Kind of Antibiotic (higher numbers are better) 
.. :·. ·.· ····· ... ·········.•······· < 
•L··· ·· surgie~f Car(l.•fuipi-oveillent :Ptoje¢t.•M:eas1lfes.·•·•·.······ · .
··.······? .......... ·····•••··•·· ···••·••·••· 
. ·. 
:- ·-.·-·.· . 
:: ······· 
. ·.·.· . 
SCIP 1 Surgery Patients Who Received Preventative X X X X Antibiotic(s) One Hour Before Incision 
Percent of Surgery Patients who Received the 
SCIP2 Appropriate Preventative Antibiotic(s) for Their X X X X 
Surgery_ 
SCIP3 Surgery Patients Whose Preventative Antibiotic(s) X X X X 
are Stopped Within 24 hours After Surgery 
SCIP4 Cardiac Surgery Patients With Controlled 6 A.M. X X X X Postoperative Blood Glucose 
SCIP6 Surgery Patients with Appropriate Hair Removal X X X X 
Surgery Patients Whose Urinary Catheters Were 
SCIP9 Removed on the First or Second Day After X X 
Surgery 
Surgery Patients Who Were Actively Warmed in 
SCIP 10 the Operating Room or Whose Body Temperature X X 
Was Near Normal by the End of Surgery 
Surgery Patients Whose Doctors Ordered 
SCIP Treatments to Prevent Blood Clots (Venous X X X X VTE 1 Thromboembolism [VTE]) for Certain Types of 
Surgeries 
SCIP Surgery Patients Who Received Treatment to 
VTE2 Prevent Blood Clots within 24 Hours Before or 
X X X X 
after Selected Surgeries to Prevent Blood Clots 
Percent of Surgery Patients Who Were Taking 
SCIP Heart Drugs Called Beta Blockers Before Coming 
CARD2 to the Hospital, Who Were Kept on the Beta X X X Blockers during the Period Just Before and After 
Their Surgery 
Notes: 
a OP 1, OP 3, and OP 5 are measured in minutes and a lower number of minutes indicates 
better quality. 
I 
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I analyzed Hospital Compare outcome measures that assess the rate of mortality 
during the 30 days following an inpatient hospital admission (regardless of whether the 
patient dies while still in the hospital or after discharge) and the rate of readmission to 
any acute inpatient facility for any cause during the 30 days following an inpatient 
hospital discharge.v The use of a 30-day window allows for consistent assessment period 
during which outcomes are strongly influenced by hospital care. 
Each measure is assessed separately for patients with a primary diagnosis of heart 
attack or heart failure. CMS obtains outcome measure data from Medicare enrollment 
and claims data for Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) beneficiaries who are 65 years or 
older and from National Patient Care Database for patients admitted to Veteran's 
Administration hospitals who are 65 years or older. vi The mortality and readmission 
outcome measures are risk adjusted by CMS to account for differences in the likelihood 
of death or readmission for the patients seen at each hospital. The risk adjustment model 
includes information on each patient's age, gender, past medical history, and other 
diseases or conditions the patient had at hospital admission that are known to increase the 
v See 
http://www.qualitynet.org/dcs/ContentServer?c=Page&pagename=QnetPublic%2FPage 
%2FQnetTier2&cid=1228763452133 for more information about outcome measures. 
vi For both measure types, CMS requires that Medicare beneficiaries have been enrolled 
in Medicare FFS parts A and B for the 12-month period prior to their admission to ensure 
complete data for risk adjustment. Medicare and VA patients with a hospice stay during 
the prior 12-month period were also excluded from both measures. For the mortality 
measures, CMS randomly selects one hospitalization in each year for each condition and 
for each patient eligible for assessment. For the readmission measure, CMS also requires 
Medicare FFS beneficiaries to remain enrolled in Medicare for the 30 days following 
discharge. Patients who were transferred to another hospital or left the hospital against 
medical advice are excluded from the readmission measure. 
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patient's risk of dying or readmission. 
The mortality and readmission measures are assessed only on Medicare FFS 
patients and are based on data collected over a 3-year period beginning on July 1st and 
ending on June 31st, three years later. These measures are updated annually for a data 
collection window advanced by one year. Analysis of these measures for consecutive 
years allows for an incremental assessment of outcome measures over time. Analysis 
periods are based on data from July 2005 through June 2008, July 2006 through June 
2009, July 2007 through June 2010, July 2008 through June 2011. The outcome measures 
analyzed are shown in Table 1.3. 
Table 1.3 Outcome Measures Analyzed, 3-Year Periods Ending June 2008, 2009, 2010, 
and 2011 
Label Measure 
AMI Mort a Hospital 30-Day Mortality (Death) Rates for Heart Attack 
AMIRead 3 Hospital30-Day Readmission Rates for Heart Attack 
HFMort 3 Hospital 30-Day Mortality (Death) Rates for Heart Failure 
HFRead 3 Hospital 30-Day Readmission Rates for Heart Failure 
Notes: 
a Lower values are better for all mortality and readmission measures. 
Methods 
To assess whether SSHs produce higher levels of quality of care compared to 
general hospitals, I conducted comparisons using process of care measure data from each 
year 2008 through 2011 and outcome measure data for rolling 3 year periods ending in 
17 
June of each year from 2008 through 2011. For each of these measure comparisons, I 
grouped orthopedic/surgical SSHs and analyzed them separately from cardiac SSHs due 
to significant differences between the two types of SSHs. I weighted each observation by 
the number of procedures on which each hospital's measure value is based. 
Not all of the process of care measures are appropriate for assessment on each 
SSH type. For cardiac SSHs, I analyzed the heart attack (AMI#), heart failure (HF #), 
and surgical care improvement project (SCIP #) measures (see Table 1.2). Cardiac SSHs 
do not have a particular focus on outpatient services. For orthopedic/surgical hospitals, I 
analyzed the outpatient (OP #)and surgical care improvement project (SCIP #)measures, 
as patients generally do not see treatment at orthopedic/surgical SSHs after a heart attack 
h f ·1 vii or eart a1 ure. 
For both cardiac and orthopedic/surgical SSHs, I conducted two sets of 
comparisons with general hospitals. One set of analyses compared measure values 
between each SSH type and all general hospitals in the U.S., while another set of analyses 
compared measure values between each SSH type and only general hospitals located in a 
hospital market where an SSH was also located. Restricting the general hospital 
comparison group to only those general hospitals in a hospital market with an SSH allows 
for a more accurate comparison by controlling for differences between hospital markets 
vii I analyzed outpatient measures for orthopedic/surgical SSHs only because outpatient 
procedures are common at orthopedic/surgical SSHs and not so common to cardiac 
SSHs. However, it is worth noting that the outpatient measures are generally focused on 
cardiac conditions. 
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with and without an SSH. For example, SSHs tend to be located in states without CON 
laws and in small or midsized urban areas. 1 
Thus, I conducted four comparisons of SSHs with general hospitals: cardiac SSHs 
with all general hospitals, orthopedic/surgical SSHs with all general hospitals, cardiac 
SSHs with general hospitals in a hospital market with an SSH, and orthopedic/surgical 
SSHs with general hospitals in a hospital market with an SSH. I defined hospital markets 
with an SSH based on the presence of either a cardiac or orthopedic/surgical SSH in 
order to present a consistent general hospital comparison group for each SSH type. 
I used Dartmouth Atlas' Hospital Referral Regions (HRRs) to define hospital 
markets in the U.S. because this definition has the most relevant defining basis and the 
large size of each HRR allows for a large number of general hospitals to be included in 
each comparison. The 306 HRRs are defined based on hospital referral patterns for major 
cardiac surgical procedures and for neurosurgery. Because the results of comparisons 
between SSHs and general hospitals located in markets with an SSH may vary based on 
the definition of hospital market, I assessed the sensitivity of market definition by 
conducting all measure comparisons using three additional defmitions of hospital market 
which vary by size and geographic defming bases. Dartmouth Atlas ' Hospital Service 
Areas (HSAs) are relatively small areas that group zip codes based on Medicare 
hospitalization patterns. viii In comparison, HRRs are relatively large aggregations of 
viii HSAs may provide a more relevant health care market definition for 
orthopedic/surgical hospitals given the type of procedures offered and HRRs use of major 
cardiac surgery and neurosurgery referral patterns. 
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HSAs based on referral patterns for major cardiovascular surgical procedures and for 
neurosurgery for those areas. ix Counties are relatively small, similar in number to HSAs, 
and are geographically defined. Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) are relatively 
large aggregations of counties, similar in number to HRRs, and are defined based on 
population centers.x For all analyses, I excluded hospitals outside the 50 United States 
and the District of Columbia. xi 
Comparisons of the process of care measures across hospitals do not need to be 
case-mix adjusted because each measure is assessed on a specific population of patients 
for whom the treatment assessed is identified as a best practice, or for whom the 
expediency of the treatment received is important given a medical emergency. In other 
words, the patients included in each process of care measure should receive the treatment 
being assessed or should receive the treatment expediently regardless of patient 
characteristics. The outcome measures assessing mortality and readmission rates are risk 
ix Dartmouth defines 3,436 HSAs based on Medicare hospitalization patterns and 
aggregates them 306 HRRs. See http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/data/region/ for more 
information. 
x There are 3,143 unique PIPS county codes in the United States aggregated to 366 MSAs 
and 48 non-MSA areas by state (D.C., RI, and NJ are classified entirely into MSAs). 
xi Results of comparisons based on HSAs, counties, and MSAs did not differ in 
meaningful ways from results based on HRRs and are not presented in the results section. 
Results of comparisons were very frequently the same for all hospital market definitions, 
though some discrepancies occurred between hospital markets of different geographic 
size (HSAs and counties are much smaller than HRRs and MSA I non-MSA areas by 
state). The small number of remaining discrepancies appeared to be random and did not 
seem to indicate any bias based on hospital market definition. 
adjusted by CMS such that reported measures are risk-standardized and comparable 
between hospitals without case-mix related bias. 
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I used t-tests weighted by the number of procedures on which each hospital's 
measure value is based to compare process of care and outcome measure values between 
SSHs and general hospitals, assessing the significance of any difference in mean values 
using the appropriate t value when variances were unequal between the two groups. 
Given the different number of SSHs and general hospitals in each comparison, variances 
between the two groups were generally unequal. I did not account for differences in case 
mix in these comparisons because the process of care measures are only assessed on 
patients for whom the measure represents best clinical practice, and the outcome 
measures are risk adjusted by CMS prior to publication. While the volume of services 
provided may also affect measure outcomes, I believe a high volume of services may be 
endogenous to the SSH business model. Nonetheless, I consider the effect of general 
hospitals being more likely to provide fewer services in the discussion. For comparisons 
with significantly different mean measure values at the five percent level, I present the 
difference between SSH and general hospital mean values, the p-value of the difference, 
and the number of SSHs and general hospitals with available data for inclusion in the 
comparison. 
Results 
Tables 1.4 and 1.5 show that cardiac SSHs had better risk-adjusted outcome 
measure values, and all SSHs had some better and some worse process of care measure 
21 
values compared to general hospitals in an HRR market with an SSH.xii Cells shaded dark 
grey with boldface values indicate that SSHs had significantly better measure values at 
the five percent level of significance, and cells shaded light grey with non-boldface 
values indicate that SSHs had significantly worse measure values than general hospitals. 
Table 1.4 shows the seven Heart Attack, six Heart Failure, and ten Surgical Care 
Improvement Project measure comparisons of cardiac SSHs and general hospitals in 
HRRs with an SSH, which had data for a majority of cardiac SSHs for at least one 
year.xiii Compared to competing general hospitals, cardiac SSHs had consistently lower 
mortality rates following an admission for heart attack (AMI Mort: about 2.2 to 2.8 
percentage points) or heart failure (HF Mort: about 0.8 to 1.2 percentage points) and 
consistently lower readmission rates following a discharge for heart failure (HF Read: 
between 0.9 to 1.2 percentage points). 
Cardiac SSHs also performed better for the early two years of the heart failure 
measure when assessed on whether patients were given discharge instructions (HF 1); 
however, these differences were not significant in later years of analysis and generally 
declined over time. xiv Cardiac SSHs also performed better when assessed on providing 
xii Results based on comparisons with all general hospitals were very similar to 
comparisons with only general hospitals in an HRR market with an SSH. Any measure I 
year differences would not change any overall conclusions about measure differences 
between SSHs and general hospitals. 
xiii None of the comparisons excluded from the table showed significant differences 
between orthopedic/surgical SSHs and general hospitals. 
xiv Left ventricular systolic function assessment may include an electrocardiogram or 
certain blood tests. 
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the appropriate preventative antibiotic(s) for their surgery (SCIP 2) for all years analyzed, 
though these differences also declined over time. Finally, cardiac SSHs performed better 
in single years of analysis for two heart attack measures and three SCIP measures, though 
no concrete trends or conclusions can be drawn from these results. 
Cardiac SSHs performed worse when assessed on whether doctors ordered 
treatments to prevent blood clots (SCIP VTE 1) in 2008 and 2009, and on whether 
patients received treatments to prevent blood clots within 24 hours before or after surgery 
(SCIP VTE 2) in 2008; however, these differences were not significant in later years of 
analysis and declined to near zero by 2011. 
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Table 1.5 shows the two Outpatient and the nine Surgical Care Improvement 
Project measure comparisons of orthopedic/surgical SSHs and general hospitals in an 
HRR with an SSH, which had data for a majority of orthopedic/surgical SSHs for at least 
one year.xv 
Orthopedic/surgical SSHs performed consistently better on both Outpatient 
measures, getting patients antibiotics at the right time (OP 6) and getting patients the 
correct antibiotic (OP 7) for nearly all years of analysis, though differences for getting 
patients antibiotics at the right time (OP 6) decreased from 2009 and 2011. 
Orthopedic/surgical SSHs were split on performance for the Surgical Care 
Improvement Project measures. These SSHs performed worse for single years of analysis 
for four measures (SCIP 1, 6, 10, and CARD 2), and showed generally declining 
differences in these measures over time. Orthopedic/surgical SSHs performed better for 
at least one year of analysis when assessed on providing the appropriate preventative 
antibiotic(s) for their surgery (SCIP 2), the removal of urinary catheters (SCIP 9), and the 
two measures assessing treatment to prevent blood clots (SCIP VTE 1, 2). However, 
when differences were found to be significant for multiple years of analysis, significant 
differences were not always found in consecutive years, and differences for these 
measures generally decreased over time. 
xv None of the comparisons excluded from the table showed significant differences 
between orthopedic/surgical SSHs and general hospitals. 
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Tables 1.6 and 1. 7 show measure values for each year of available data and the 
percent change in each measure over that period for SSHs and general hospitals in an 
HRR with an SSH. Cells are highlighted to show the years for which measure values 
were significantly different between cardiac SSHs and general hospitals. Cells shaded 
dark grey with boldface values indicate that SSHs had significantly better measure values 
at the five percent level of significance, and cells shaded light grey with non-boldface 
values indicate that SSHs had significantly worse measure values than general hospitals. 
Table 1.6 shows that nearly all measures improved over time for both cardiac 
SSHs and general hospitals in an HRR with an SSH. Lower values indicate better 
performance for mortality and readmission measures and thus negative percent change 
values for these outcomes indicate improvements in performance over time. For mortality 
rates following a heart attack (AMI Mort), cardiac SSHs performed better than general 
hospitals with a fairly consistent mortality rate across all years, but general hospitals 
showed a larger improvement over time. For mortality and readmission rates following 
heart failure (HF Mort, HF Read), cardiac SSHs performed consistently better than 
general hospitals and both types of hospitals showed slight decreases in performance over 
the analysis period. 
For all process measures with at least one year of significantly better performance 
for cardiac SSHs compared to general hospitals (AMI 2, AMI 3, HF 1, SCIP 2, SCIP 3, 
SCIP CARD 2), both types of hospitals improved performance over the analysis period. 
However, general hospitals made equal or larger improvements for nearly all of these 
measures (except SCIP CARD 2), and thus reduced differences between the two hospital 
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types. Similarly, for the two process measures with at least one year of significantly 
better performance for general hospitals compared to cardiac SSHs (SCIP VTE 1, SCIP 
VTE 2), both hospital types improved over the analysis period; however, cardiac SSHs 
improved by a much greater margin and significantly reduced the gap in performance on 
those measures by 2011. 
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Table 1.6 Measure Values and Percent Change for Cardiac SSHs and General Hospitals 
in an HRR with an SSH, 2008- 2011a 
Measure 2008 
Marte 
AMI 
Reade 
Marte 
HF 
Reade 
SCIP 
VTE2 
SCIP 
CARD2 91.2 
0.4% 
8.9% 
89.8 5.4% 
Notes: 
a White cells show measure differences between SSHs and general hospitals that were not 
significant at the 5% level. Dark grey cells with boldface values show measure comparisons 
for which cardiac SSHs performed better at the 5% level of significance. Light grey cells 
with non-boldface values show measure comparisons for which cardiac SSHs performed 
worse at the 5% level of significance. Cells with "NA" represent years for which no data 
was collected for a particular measure and cells with"-" represent years for which not 
enough data was available for analysis. 
b Percent change is measured between the earliest and most recent year of available data. 
c Lower values represent better outcomes for Mortality and readmission measures for 
cardiac SSHs and general hospitals. 
Table 1.7 shows that all measures improved over time for both 
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orthopedic/surgical SSHs and general hospitals in an HRR with an SSH. For three of the 
five process measures with at least one year of significantly better performance for 
orthopedic/surgical SSHs (OP 6, OP 7, SCIP 2, SCIP 9, SCIP VTE 2), general hospitals 
increased performance levels by a larger amount over the analysis period. Of these 
measures, the gap in performance increased for OP 7 and SCIP 2 by a small amount. For 
the three process measures that showed better performance for general hospitals in one 
year and had at least two years of analysis (SCIP 1, SCIP 6, SCIP CARD 2), 
orthopedic/surgical SSHs increased performance levels by a slightly larger amount than 
general hospitals. 
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Table 1.7 Measure Values and Percent Change for Orthopedic/Surgical SSHs and 
General Hospitals in an HRR with an SSH, 2008- 2011 a 
Measure 
SClP 
VTE2 8.9% 
SClP 
CARD2 
Notes: 
5.4% 
a White cells show measure differences between SSHs and general hospitals that were not 
significant at the 5% level. Dark grey cells with boldface values show measure comparisons 
for which cardiac SSHs performed better at the 5% level of significance. Light grey cells with 
non-boldface values show measure comparisons for which cardiac SSHs performed worse at 
the 5% level of significance. Cells with "NA" represent years for which no data was collected 
for a particular measure and cells with"-" represent years for which not enough data was 
available for analysis. 
b Percent change is measured as the change between the earliest and most recent year of 
available data. 
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Limitations and Notes 
The major limitation of this study is sample size. Only 25 cardiac SSHs and 115 
orthopedic/surgical SSHs had the necessary data to be included in the analysis. The 
number of SSHs in each analysis was further reduced by the availability of data, 
particularly for comparisons between cardiac SSHs and general hospitals on analyses of 
measures AMI 7, AMI 8, and AMI 10; as well as comparisons between 
orthopedic/surgical SSHs and general hospitals on analyses of measures OP 1, OP 2, OP 
3, OP 4, OP 5, and SCIP 4. Therefore, these analyses did not significantly contribute to 
the conclusions drawn from the study results. Overall, the small number of SSHs in 
existence may have limited the statistical power of some comparisons. 
Mortality and readmission variables are based on three years of data, therefore 
analyzing consecutive years of these variables presents some overlap in the data used in 
each analysis and results for the mortality and readmission analyses may appear to 
change less across the four years analyzed than the process of care measures. 
Discussion and Future Research 
Throughout this paper, I have compared SSHs to general hospitals by considering 
33 separate measures, 24 of which had sufficient data for analysis. Arguably, the most 
important of these are the four measures assessing mortality and readmission rates 
between cardiac SSHs and general hospitals. Results from this study are consistent with 
prior research which shows that cardiac SSHs perform modestly better for some 
outcomes measures. Specifically, I found that cardiac SSHs consistently had mortality 
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rates following a heart attack or heart failure that were significantly lower than general 
hospitals by about one to two percent. Readmission rates following heart failure were 
about one percent lower. 
While mortality and readmission measures were risk-adjusted by CMS to account 
for demographic and health differences in the population being analyzed, there have been 
concerns about whether the adjustment adequately accounts for differences in patient 
population between hospitals. In particular, researchers have found that there is a higher 
risk of death following a heart attack at a low-volume hospital compared to a high-
volume hospital. 21 '22'23'24'25 In this study, cardiac SSHs tend to treat a higher volume of 
heart attack and heart failure patients than general hospitals, which could affect the 
results. xvi In 2011, the median number of heart attack patients included in the mortality 
measure was 250 in cardiac SSHs (inter-quartile range: 191 to 486) and 128 in general 
hospitals (inter-quartile range: 55 to 255). Differences in the volume distributions 
between cardiac SSHs and general hospitals were similar for the other risk-adjusted 
mortality and readmission measures. CMS has adjusted for the bias of higher mortality 
rates in low-volume hospitals by using a hierarchical logistic regression model, which has 
the effect of shifting the risk-adjusted mortality and readmission rates for low-volume 
hospitals toward the national mean rate for each measure. While this adjustment may 
partially address bias between volume and the risk-adjusted outcome rates, some 
researchers are still concerned that the adjustment addresses the imprecision of low-
xvi Very low-volume hospitals, those with less than 25 cases per analysis year, were 
excluded from analyses. 
volume hospital mortality rates, but not the directionality showing low-volume hospital 
mortality rates are higher.26 
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Given that hospitals with low-volume heart attack or heart failure measures in this 
study are more likely to be general hospitals, any bias resulting from inadequate risk 
adjustment would show that SSHs had lower mortality and readmission rates than their 
true value. While it is difficult to assess how much of the difference between SSH and 
general hospital mortality and readmission rates is due to better outcomes for SSHs and 
how much may be attributable to inadequate risk adjustment, the mortality and 
readmission results are consistent across all four years of the study and were robust when 
SSHs were compared to all general hospital as well as only those in the same hospital 
market as an SSH. 
No study has previously compared timeliness and effectiveness of care measures 
between SSHs and general hospitals. In this study, cardiac SSHs performed significantly 
better at giving discharge instructions in 2008 and 2009. While this difference decreased 
and did not remain significant at the 5 percent level in 2010 and 2011, cardiac SSHs' 
performance remained higher than general hospitals for those two years. Cardiac SSHs 
also provided the appropriate antibiotic for a significantly higher percentage of surgeries 
than general hospitals in all years assessed. Also for these measures, orthopedic/surgical 
SSHs performed better than general hospitals in the same HRR for multiple years of 
analysis when assessed on providing the appropriate preventative antibiotic(s) for their 
surgery, removing of urinary catheters, and providing treatment to prevent blood clots at 
the appropriate time. However, significant differences were not always found in 
consecutive years and differences for these measures generally decreased over time. 
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In general, cardiac SSHs treated a larger number of patients on average for most 
measures in 2011, including all measures for which cardiac SSHs had at least one year of 
significantly better performance compared to general SSHs. For the three measures on 
which cardiac SSHs performed significantly better for multiple years, cardiac SSHs 
treated between 14 and 19 percent more patients on average in 2011 than general 
hospitals. Cardiac SSHs treated about 75 percent fewer patients on average for the two 
measures that assessed treatment to prevent blood clots. On those measures, cardiac SSHs 
performed worse during early years of study, but that difference diminished to near zero 
in 2011 despite the difference in volume. In contrast, orthopedic/surgical SSHs treated 
fewer patients on average for all measures in 2011, without distinction between measures 
for which SSHs performed significantly better or significantly worse than general 
hospitals. Based on these descriptive statistics, it is difficult to make a conclusion about 
the relationship between patient volume and SSH quality of care, though the relationship 
between volume and quality for cardiac SSHs appears to be aligned. 
These results show a few modest differences in outcomes between SSHs and 
general hospitals. Specifically, higher performance was focused on mortality and 
readmission rates in cardiac SSHs and a few timeliness of care measures for both cardiac 
and orthopedic/surgical SSHs. However, results were significant for only a few of the 
several timeliness and effectiveness measures with sufficient data for multiple years of 
comparison. Nine cardiac and three orthopedic/surgical SSH measures showed no 
differences in any year, while six cardiac and four orthopedic/surgical SSH measures 
showed a significant difference in only one out of multiple years analyzed. 
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Analysis of SSH and general hospital comparisons over time suggests that 
external factors may have influenced these results. Specifically, the public reporting of 
quality data in the Hospital Care database may have served as feedback for individual 
hospitals to assess their own performance and identify areas for improvement. The results 
presented in Tables 1.6 and 1.7 show that nearly all quality measure scores increased over 
time for both SSHs and general hospitals. These results support the potential for a 
feedback loop whereby differences in performance between SSHs and general hospitals 
generally diminished over the analysis period. General hospitals showed larger 
improvements in performance during the analysis period on measures for which general 
hospitals performed worse than SSHs·, and SSHs show larger improvements in 
performance on measures for which SSHs performed worse than for general hospitals. 
Future analysis of these performance measures may evaluate whether use of the quality 
data by hospitals shows a direction of spillover from SSHs to general hospitals, or vice 
versa. 
While these results show evidence of some quality improvement spillover 
between SSHs and general hospitals, the direction of a spillover slightly favors spillover 
from SSHs to general hospitals, while evidence of the reverse direction exists, but is more 
limited. Specifically, cardiac SSHs performed significantly worse than general hospitals 
for 2 blood clot treatment measures in early years of analysis. Table 1.4 shows that over 
the four years of analysis, the difference for SCIP VTE 1 decreased from a -10.4 to about 
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-0.8 percent and the SCIP VTE 2 difference decreased from -10.2 to -0.9 percent. For 
orthopedic/surgical SSHs, table 1.5 shows that for SCIP 1 a difference of -3.4 in 2008 
decreased to -0.1 in 2011, and for SCIP 6 a difference of -2.3 in 2008 decreased to -0.1 in 
2011. These results show potential quality spillovers in both directions, and more 
generally support the possibility that the availability of quality data to all hospitals has 
reduced the range of quality measure scores across all hospital types over time. 
This study provides some minor support for SSHs' claims that they produce 
higher quality of care than competing general hospitals; however, this modest support is 
strongest based on early years of analysis since the extent of higher quality of care 
produced at SSHs generally diminished from 2008 to 2011. In addition, some quality 
differences for cardiac SSHs may be weakly aligned with differences in the volume of 
patients. Based on these findings, it is possible that innovations in hospital organization 
and physician management may have contributed to the production of higher quality of 
care in SSHs; however, the lack of persistence in quality differences as well as increases 
in quality measures for all hospital types suggests that the impact of these innovations is 
only slightly robust relative to other factors affecting quality. 
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2. Retail Health Clinic Location Explained by Economic Factors, Unhindered by 
State Nurse Practitioner Regulations 
Introduction 
For Americans with a need for primary health care, the search for a nearby 
primary care physician who has an appointment available for the same day and accepts 
their insurance plan can be frustrating. While same day services have long been available 
at urgent care clinics and more recently from other primary care providers through open 
access scheduling of office visits, phone visits, as well as various web-based visit 
models;27•28 retail health clinics (RHC) have made a notable impact in the market for 
same day primary care services and are poised for another significant expansion.29 Since 
the first clinic opened in 2000, RHCs have offered certain preventive, diagnostic, and 
simple acute treatment services at affordable prices, with convenient hours (including 
weekends and evenings), no appointment required, and typically short wait times. RHC 
labor costs are relatively low, in part, due to employing nurse practitioners (NPs) or 
physician assistants (PAs) rather than physicians. RHCs' focus on common illnesses and 
their location in high-traffic retail stores supports demand for RHC services and also 
helps to keep overhead costs low.xvii 
While it initially took some years for this limited-service model to catch on, a 
period of rapid growth resulted in an increase in the number of RHCs from about 60 in 
xvii Retail health clinics are also referred to as retail-based clinics, convenient care clinics, 
and limited service clinics. 
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the beginning of2006 to an estimated 1,200 in late 2008.30 Since then, RHC growth has 
continued at a more modest pace. Current estimates suggest that there were more than 
1,500 in existence as of January 2014.xviii The number ofRHC users has grown 
accordingly as the number of families visiting an RHC increased from 1.7 million during 
2007 to 4.1 million during 2010.31 In all, over 20 million patients have received care at an 
RHC. 
As the RHC market grows and interacts with the rest of the health care market, 
positive and negative effects are beginning to emerge. RHCs appear to fill a gap in access 
to care for patients who do not have a primary care physician, especially patients without 
health insurance, and may offer patients a substitute for more costly care providers, 
. 1 d' f '1' . d d 32 33 34 Im . me u mg urgent care ac11ties an emergency epartments. · · provmg access to 
primary care providers is of particular importance given concerns about the pending 
increase in the number of Americans with health insurance and the potential shortfall in 
the number of primary care physicians. For instance, the Massachusetts 2006 health 
reform law increased the number of people with health insurance in the state, and some 
studies showed that the increase exacerbated the existing trends of longer wait times and 
lower numbers of physicians accepting new patients. 35•36 The national health reform law 
is expected to increase the number of people with health insurance in 2014 nationwide; 
xviii As of January 2014, the Convenient Care Association states that there are over 1,500 
RHCs in operation 
(http://www.ccaclinics.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4&1temid= 
116), and the Merchant Medicine, publisher of the ConvUrgentCare Report, states that 
there were 1,603 RHCs in operation as of January 21, 2014 
(http://www .merchantmedicine.comlhome.cfm). 
40 
consequently, RHCs may experience even higher demand for services as constrictions on 
primary care physician access force demand to shift to RHCs. Given the expected 
increase in demand, market analysts expect another round of strong growth and project a 
near doubling in the number of RHCs over the next four years. 37•38 CVS/Caremark, the 
nation's largest chain RHC organization, also expects to nearly double the number of its 
MinuteClinic locations over the next four years, and has recently opened new locations in 
states previously without any RHCs.39 
Some physician associations believe the RHC model fosters fragmentation and 
lack of care coordination. The American Academy of Family Physicians contends that 
RHC's limited scope "can ultimately lead to fragmentation of the patient's health care 
unless it is coordinated with the patient's primary care physician's office." 40 The 
American Medical Association has laid-out policies for RHCs largely focusing on 
maintaining coordination of care with a primary care physician.41 However, new RHC 
expansions into certain chronic care management services may encroach on these 
policies.42 The American Academy of Pediatrics has also raised concern regarding 
"possible effects on quality of care" related to RHC services.43 Yet, despite increased 
concerns, studies comparing available quality metrics have not found that quality of care 
. l . RHC 44 45 46 IS ower m s. · · 
While most NP regulations were in place prior to the period of major RHC 
growth, the growth in NP employment and RHCs has resulted in increased scrutiny on 
regulations governing NPs. Some regulatory aspects of NP practice are relatively uniform 
across states, such as, regulations on practice qualifications and each state's role in 
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governing NP practices. Conversely, some NP regulations are evolving, yielding wide 
variation in NP practice and prescriptive authority with respect to requirements for 
physician collaboration as well as differences in NP designation as a primary care 
provider (PCP) for Medicaid and private insurers.47,48,49 Given the reliance of RHCs on 
NPs, variation in these regulations may have influenced the growth ofRHCs. 
Other state laws and regulations also affect aspects of RHC practice, but are 
unlikely to have a significant influence on RHC growth. Practice and prescribing 
authority regulations for PAs, the second most common provider in RHCs, tend to be 
uniform across states and are generally consistent with the inherent collaborative nature 
between physicians and physician assistants. In a majority of states, RHCs are treated like 
private physician offices and are not subject to additional regulations; however, a few 
states require RHCs to obtain a physician clinic license and are thus regulated by the state 
medical board.31 •50 Of the five states that require such a license, all five have RHCs in 
operation.xix Given this context, regulations affecting NPs are the most likely factors to 
have influenced where RHCs chose to operate. 
While there has been some analysis relating RHC location and patient-level 
characteristics, including income levels, age, and distance to the nearest RHC,31•51 •52 there 
has been little analysis assessing the influence of state regulations and other health care 
market-level factors on RHC location. Some researchers find that scope of practice 
regulations significantly affect use of NPs,53 and other experts speculate that 
xix In addition to these 5 states, RI designates RHCs as outpatient clinics and would thus 
require RHCs to obtain a license; however, there are no RHCs in operation in RI. 
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"assessments of market demand play a more significant role than state regulations in 
decisions about where to locate [RHCs]." 31 This paper evaluates whether state 
regulations limiting NPs practice authority and Medicaid PCP designation affect RHC 
location in health care markets, taking into account other factors associated with market 
demand and factors related to the supply of primary care services. 
Background 
Retail Health Clinics provide basic preventive, diagnostic, and simple acute services 
and are located in retail stores. While there are some differences among the RHC chains, 
RHCs generally offer services with the following characteristics: 
• walk-in availability with no appointment required, 
• open during evening and weekends hours, 
• short wait times, 
• accept most health insurance plans, including Medicare and Medicaid,xx 
• publicly-posted prices are lower than alternative providers, including emergency 
departments (most expensive), urgent care clinics (more expensive), and even 
physician offices (somewhat more expensive),xxi 
xx According to their websites, the two largest RHC chains, CVS MinuteClinic and 
Walgreens Healthcare Clinic, accept state Medicaid plans in most of the states where 
their RHCs are located. 
xxi For patients paying out of pocket, RHC prices are generally lower other locations. For 
patients with health insurance coverage at the relevant locations, copayments are 
generally the same for visits to an RHC and to a physician office, but copayments are 
generally larger for visits to an urgent care clinic or to an emergency department. 
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• pharmacy often located at the same retail location, 
• focus includes a set of low-acuity conditions, some of which are more urgent and 
may otherwise require a visit to a more expensive urgent care provider: 
o Minor injury (wounds and abrasions, bug bites and stings, certain sprains), 
o Minor illness (allergy, influenza, pink eye), 
o Labs and tests (mononucleosis test, pregnancy test, quick strep test), 
o Skin conditions (athlete's foot, ringworm, wart), 
• additional focus on a set of low-acuity conditions that are more conveniently 
treated without an appointment: 
o Chronic condition monitoring (diabetes, high cholesterol), 
o Vaccinations (influenza, hepatitis, measles/mumps/rubella), 
o Wellness and physical exams (diabetes screening, college/school physical, 
smoking cessation). 
Some of these characteristics are also found in urgent care clinics; however, 
urgent care clinics are distinguished from RHCs as they have a physician on-site during 
most operating hours, have x-ray machines and other diagnostic equipment on-site, and 
treat a more severe set of conditions and injuries, including broken bones and lacerations 
requiring stitches. Thus, urgent care clinics can handle conditions and injuries that require 
more immediate attention than RHCs can provide; however, the visit price is also higher. 
While RHC chains share many similar characteristics, three different organizational 
structures are common: some RHCs are owned by the retail company whose stores house 
the clinic (e.g., MinuteClinic is owned by CVS Caremark and operated in CVS/Pharmacy 
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stores); some RHCs are individually owned and operated by independent health care 
providers (e.g., several different health systems and medical centers operate clinics in 
Wal-Mart stores); and some RHCs are owned and operated by a third-party RHC 
company, which has affiliations with local health systems and has a contract to operate in 
a retail company's stores (e.g., RediClinic is affiliated with three local health systems and 
operates in H-E-B grocery stores). 
As of January 2014, RHCs associated with the largest chain organizations were 
operating in 37 states and the District of Columbia.xxii Ten states contain nearly 60 
percent of all RHCs and 95 percent of all RHCs are located in just 25 states. In other 
states, RHC operation may be limited by laws and regulations directed at RHCs or NPs, 
the most common providers at RHCs. 
Five states require RHCs to be licensed as physician clinics and are thus regulated 
by state medical boards.xxili Yet, all five states have RHCs in operation, and the licensing 
requirements do not appear to limit the number of RHCs in each state. Other laws have 
been enacted that appear to influence RHC operation more directly. Most prominently, a 
law enacted in Florida in 2007 prohibits primary care physicians from supervising more 
than four office facilities. To the extent that RHC chains rely on physicians to supervise 
more than four RHCs, this law would require RHCs to hire more physicians. While these 
laws are specific to RHCs, they do not occur in enough states to evaluate their impact. 
xxii Based on my analysis of RHC data described in the Data section of this paper. 
xxili These states are AZ, FL, KY, MA, and NH. Rl does not have any RHCs, but any 
RHCs operating in the state would be designated as outpatient clinics and thus would 
required to obtain a license. 
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Laws and regulations governing the scope-of-practice for NPs varies widely 
across states.48•54 Seventeen states and the District of Columbia allow NPs to both 
practice (diagnose, treat, and refer patients) and prescribe medication independently of a 
physician;xxiv an additional eleven states allow NPs to practice independently from a 
physician.47 The remaining 22 states require physician collaboration, meaning 
supervision, authorization, delegation, or direction for all aspects of NPs practice. In 
states that require collaboration with a physician, some aspects of NP practice may also 
be required to adhere to written protocols. 55 Scope-of-practice laws have less of an effect 
on PAs, RHCs second most common staff, as physician collaboration is a general model 
for physician assistants. PA prescribing authority is nearly uniform across states, with all 
but two states allowing PAs to prescribe most medications. 
NPs are eligible for direct reimbursement under Medicare rules and may serve as 
PCPs for private managed care plans administered under Medicare Advantage program. 
In addition, federal law requires NPs to be authorized for reimbursement in all states 
under the traditional Medicaid fee-for-service system. However, most states have moved 
Medicaid enrollees to managed care models that require a PCP as a first point of contact. 
Only 33 states and the District of Columbia explicitly authorize NPs to be a Medicaid 
PCP, which may affect RHCs ability to bill Medicaid managed care programs without 
physician involvement. 
xxiv NY will join this group of states starting in 2015. 
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Framework 
This paper evaluates whether state regulations limiting NPs' practice authority 
and Medicaid PCP designation affect RHC location in health care markets, taking into 
account other demand and supply factors that affect RHC location. Demand factors likely 
to be associated with RHC location include higher population density, families of a 
younger age, higher income, or having private insurance.31 ·51·52 These factors are 
expected to be associated with a higher likelihood of RHC location as they ensure a 
sufficient number of patients who are likely to seek new models of primary health care 
and have the income or insurance necessary to pay for needed care. I included several 
variables in the analysis to assess the association of RHC location with population 
density, health insurance levels, and socioeconomic status. 
Supply factors likely to be associated with RHC location include: not being a 
Health Professional Shortage Area;51 the availability of substitute primary care 
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a particular geographic area. I included several variables to assess the association of RHC 
location with the availability of primary care providers and substitute providers, a wage 
index, and a state business tax climate index. 
This paper tests the hypothesis that health care markets in states with regulations 
that limit NPs' practice and prescribing authority as well as Medicaid PCP designation 
are less likely to have RHCs in operation, after taking into account factors associated 
with market demand and the supply of primary care services. To evaluate this hypothesis, 
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I estimated a logistic regression model, which assessed the association of population 
demand and health care market factors with RHC locations in the United States. 
Data 
I gathered a list of 1,546 RHCs from the websites of the retail stores, grocery 
stores, and pharmacies in which these clinics are located. xxv I used the Convenient Care 
Association website and news articles to identify 11 of the largest RHC chains that were 
operational as of January 2014. xxvi Using the websites of those 11 chains, I created a list 
of names and zip codes for RHCs that operated as walk-in health care clinics and were 
located in a retail setting. Table 2.1 shows the number of RHCs in each chain and the 
states in which each chain operates. 
xxv As of January 2014, the Convenient Care Association states that there are over 1,500 
RHCs in operation 
(http://www .ccaclinics .org/index. php? option=com_ content&view=article&id=4&Itemid= 
116), and the Merchant Medicine, publisher of the ConvUrgentCare Report, states that 
there were 1,603 RHCs in operation as of January 21, 2014 
(http://www.merchantmedicine.com/home.cfm). I excluded 72 RiteAid NowClinics 
because they use an in-store internet terminal to connect you to a health care provider, a 
model that is significantly different from the RHCs in my analysis. Additional differences 
in the total number of RHCs may be due to smaller or newer RHC chains that had little 
location information available at the time of analysis. 
xxvi I accessed the Convenient Care Association website (www.ccaclinics.org) for fmal 
identification ofRHC chains on January 21,2014. 
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Table 2.1 Number of RHCs by Chain Affiliation and State of Operation 
Retail Health Clinic Number States of Operation 
ofRHCs 
AZ, CA, CT, DC, FL, GA, HI, IL, IN, KS, LA, 
CVS MinuteClinic 800 MD, MA, MI, MN, MO, NV, NH, NJ, NY, NC, 
OH, OK, PA, SC, TN, TX, VA 
Walgreens HealthCare Clinic 395 AZ, CO, DE, FL, GA, IL, IN, KS, KY, LA, MO, NV, NJ, OH, PA, TN, TX, WI 
Kroger The Little Clinic 112 AZ,CO,GA, KY,OH,TN 
The Clinic at Wal-Mart a 88 AR, CA, GA, IL, IN, KS, KY, ME, MN, MS, MO, NV, NC, OH, PA, TN, TX, VA, WV, WI 
Target Clinic 69 FL, IL, MD, MN, NC, VA 
H-E-B Stores RediClinic 30 TX 
FastCare Clinics b 25 IL, MI, MN, OH, PA, SD, WI 
Aurora Quickcare c 10 WI 
RiteAid Lindora Health Clinic 7 CA 
Duane Reade DR Walk-In 7 NY 
Hy-Vee Curaquick Clinic 3 IA,MN,SD 
Notes: 
a Several RHC chains and independent health systems operate clinics inside Wal-Mart stores. 
b FastCare Clinics operate in Shapka, Jewel-Osco, Giant Eagle, Giant, ShopRite, Kessler' s, and 
Wal-Mart stores. One FastCare clinic operating in a hospital medical center is not included in the 
list of RHCs. 
c Aurora QuickCare clinics operate in Piggly Wiggly and Wal-Mart stores, the Aurora Pharmacy, 
and two retail malls. 
Next, I gathered data from several sources to identify specific population-level 
demand factors and market-level information on factors affecting provider supply and 
state regulations. Population demand characteristics include the health insurance, income, 
and employment status of people living in each health care market. Factors affecting 
provider supply include the number of primary care physicians by license and type, 
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number of health care providing institutions by type, relative tax burden, and the relative 
wage and capital costs of conducting business. I reviewed several sources to identify state 
regulations on NP scope of practice and Medicaid reimbursement status that may affect 
RHC location. The specific variables and data sources are listed in Table 2.2. 
The Area Health Resource File (AHRF) is a county-level dataset compiled from 
several sources by the Health Resources and Services Adrninistration.xxvii I used several 
variables from the 2012 AHRF dataset in my analysis, most of which represent 2011 
values for the variables used, though some variables represent slightly older values. The 
variable quantifying the number of persons eligible for Medicaid represent data from 
2008, while the variable quantifying the number of licensed pharmacists represent data 
from 2009. These were the most recent estimates available in the AHRF.xxviii I 
incorporated AHRF variables in my analysis that assess population demographic 
information, health insurance status, and health care utilization, as well as the number of 
health care providers by type. 
The Tax Foundation calculates an annual State Business Tax Climate Index 
(SBTCI) to assess the relative tax burden on different states. The SBTCI is calculated at 
the state-level and is designed to assess the relative competitiveness in attracting new 
businesses and effectiveness at generating economic and employment growth for each 
xxvii More information about the AHRF can be found at: http://arf.hrsa.gov. 
xxviii The lag for the Medicaid eligible variable is likely due to the time required to collect 
data from the Medicaid programs of all 50 states and D.C., and develop the annual 
person-level file, Medicaid Analytic eXtract, which is the basis of this variable. Similarly, 
the licensed pharmacists variable is based on state licensure board data and requires the 
download and coordination of data from all states and D.C., except Hawaii and Alaska. 
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state's tax system. The methodology incorporates the following taxes from each state: 
individual income, sales, corporate income, property, and unemployment insurance. I 
used the 2011 SBTCI values, which range from 0 to 10, in my analysis. 56 
To assess the cost of providing health care in each health care market, I used the 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) hospital wage index (WI) in my 
analysis. CMS calculates the WI annually based on a survey of wages and wage-related 
costs of short-term, acute care hospitals and uses it to adjust Medicare reimbursement 
levels to most provider types for differences in market wages at the metropolitan 
statistical area (MSA) level. 57 While the CMS WI is a convenient method to capture 
geographic differences in labor costs, it is calculated based on hospitals' labor costs and 
therefore not necessarily representative of the labor costs of nurse practitioners and 
physician assistants employed at RHCs. Despite the different mix of health care 
professionals underlying the CMS WI, it is likely correlated with RHC labor costs such 
that it is reasonable to use in this analysis. I also considered using the capital geographic 
adjustment factor (GAF) to assess differences in capital costs in each health care market; 
however, the capital GAF is calculated as a function of the WI and thus would provide no 
additional information to explain RHC location.xxix In my analysis, I used the 2011 WI 
values, which are normalized to an average value of 1.0. 
I identified the following state-based laws and regulations that may have an 
influence on RHC location and development: NP authorization to be a Medicaid PCP; NP 
xxix The capital GAF is calculated as the WI raised to the power of 0.6825 for each MSA 
and non-MSA area. 
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authority to diagnose, treat, and refer patients; and NP authority to prescribe medications. 
Because the 17 states plus D.C. that allow NPs to prescribe medication independently of 
a physician are a subset of the 28 states plus D.C. that allow NPs to practice 
independently, I analyzed the influence of NP practice authority and NP prescribing 
authority in separate analyses. I also considered the impact of state licensing 
requirements for RHCs and limits on PA prescribing authority, but neither had sufficient 
variation to have a measurable impact on RHC location. The National Governors 
Association reviewed the PCP designation rules from each state's Medicaid regulations 
and administrative rules and generated a list indicating which states authorize NPs to be a 
Medicaid PCP.47 The Kaiser Family Foundation reviewed the 2012 Pearson Report, a 
state-by-state NP legislation and regulation summary, and created an indicator for 2011 
that identified whether each state and the District of Columbia requires physician 
involvement when NPs diagnose and treat patients as well as when NPs prescribe 
medication to patients.=·55 Table 2.2 contains a summary of all variables included in the 
model. 
xxx For ME, I determined that physician involvement was required overall, as the Kaiser 
Family Foundation websites states that physician involvement is required for fust two 
years of practice. 
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Table 2.2 Variables Analyzed by Data Source and Year 
Year Variable Description Variable Unit A d 
ssesse 
~·[!":,:'.·' · .. : ,: ,· .·5~; ;. · ~re~J!1~~-~~ R~~b.Ji~~\E'ii~··:~~Ii~b!~~~~~~.qiey;;Ie!ei'd;lJa . ·,,;:······ :••••••·• ··m· :· ' .. ··· 
Population Density 100 per Square Mile 2010 
Persons in Poverty Percent 2011 
Unemployment Rate, ages 16+ Percent 2011 
Median Household Income Dollars in 10,000s 2011 
Persons Eligible for Medicaid Percent 2008 
Persons Eligible for Medicare a Percent 2011 
Enrollment in Medicare Part Db Percent 2011 
Persons Less than 65 without Health Insurance Percent 2010 
Primary Care Health Prof. Shortage, Full County c Yes/No 2011 
Primary Care Physicians, Patient Care Per 100,000 people 2011 
Physician Assistants with NPI ct Per 100,000 people 2011 
Nurse Practitioners with NPid Per 100,000 people 2011 
Licensed Pharmacists Per 100,000 people 2009 
Home Health Agencies Per 100,000 people 2011 
Rural Health Clinics Per 100,000 people 2011 
Federally Qualified Health Centers Per 100,000 people 2011 
Emergency Department Visits, Short Term Hospitals Per person 
.·,·.'•:, ···,:· · ... ·~'·.·::~·· 'Jl.#x)J~tiria~ti6-n~i~:~{!t~~~~!~1da~'-.,_:·· ,, ...... .... , .:· , 
2010 
State Business Tax Climate Index Index value [0- 10] 2011 
Wage Index Index value 2011 
Nurse Practitioners Authorized to be Medicaid PCP Yes/No 2011 
Nurse Practitioners can Practice Independently Yes/No 2011 
Nurse Practitioners can Prescribe Independently Yes/No 2011 
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Notes: 
a Beneficiaries can become eligible to enroll in Medicare by reaching 65 years of age, called 
Aged enrollment, or by having one of a set of disabilities prior to age 65, called Disabled 
enrollment. Medicare Part A covers inpatient hospital services, and Medicare Part B covers 
certain physician, outpatient hospital, laboratory and other services, and medical equipment and 
supplies. Most Medicare beneficiaries are enrolled in both Parts A and B. 
b Medicare Part D is a voluntary program that covers outpatient prescription drugs. 
c The Health Resources and Services Administration designates areas as having a primary care 
health professional shortage if there are more than 3,500 people per primary care physician. 
While the designation is applied to several different types of areas, I incorporated the 
designation only for whole counties. 
d NPI is CMS's National Provider Identifier, which is required for providers to bill for services 
and receive direct reimbursement from Medicare, Medicaid, and private insurers. 
Methods 
I estimated a logistic regression model to assess whether the population and 
market factors are associated with an RHC being located in a particular health care 
market. I separated health care markets in the 50 United States and the District of 
Columbia into two dependent variable categories: markets with one or more RHCs and 
markets with no RHCs. xxxi I used counties as the definition of health care market for my 
analysis due to their small size and geographic basis, both of which are relevant for 
analyzing RHC catchment area. However, because this analysis may be dependent on the 
definition of a health care market, I conducted additional regressions using different 
definitions of a health care market: MSAs, and the Dartmouth Atlas' Hospital Service 
Areas (HSAs) and Hospital Referral Regions (HRRs). 
xxxi The methodology and conceptual framework for this analysis is fundamentally similar 
to the analysis in Chapter 3, which addresses factors affecting hospital service 
specialization. 
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Each health care market definition uniquely identifies geographic areas by size 
and defining basis, and thus provides an assessment of the sensitivity of the results to 
these factors. Comparing regression results across market definitions can also be used to 
identify differences in the results that may be attributed to the characteristics of each 
health care market definition. The United States contains 3,143 counties, which are 
relatively small, geographically defined areas. MSAs are relatively large aggregations of 
counties and are defined based on population centers. Geographical analysis based on 
MSAs incorporates the 363 MSAs in the U.S. along with 48 non-MSA areas divided by 
state for a total of 411 health care markets.xxxii HSAs are relatively small areas of zip 
codes grouped by Medicare hospitalization patterns and are similar in size to counties. 
There are 3,436 HSAs in the U.S. The 306 HRRs in the U.S. are relatively large 
aggregations of HSAs grouped by referral patterns for major cardiovascular surgical 
procedures and for neurosurgery. 
Before running regressions on each of the different health care market definitions, 
I matched each of the input datasets, which were at the zip code, county, MSA, and state-
level, to the geographic level of each market definition. To merge these datasets I used 
the zip code to HSA to HRR crosswalk created by the Dartmouth Atlas, 58 the county to 
MSA crosswalk for 2009 created by the Office of Management and Budget,xxxiii,S9 and a 
xxxii There are only 48 states with non-MSA areas as the D.C., RI, and NJ are classified 
entirely into MSAs. Due to limitations in data availability across all sources, analysis 
only included 409 MSA and non-MSA areas. 
xxxiii MSA definitions for 2010 and later years are based on the decennial census results, 
which were not available at the time of analysis. 
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mapping of zip codes to counties in the Statistical Analysis Software (SAS) system that 
uses each zip code's centroid to assign each zip code to the county:uxiv,60 
I transformed the zip code-level RHC dataset to each of the health care market 
levels by using the crosswalks described above and creating a new variable identifying 
each market as having or lacking an RHC. The AHRF dataset contained county-level 
information, so I created county and MSA-level health care market variables directly and 
from the county to MSA crosswalk. To create HSA-level variables, I used the mapping of 
zip codes to counties to identify a county-level value for each zip code in an HSA. Then I 
calculated the average county-level value across all zip codes in an HSA, and thus used 
the number of zip codes associated with each county as a weight in determining HSA-
level values of variables that cross county lines. I used the same method to create HRR-
level variables for the AHRF county-level variables. For MSA-level information in the 
CMS WI variables, I used the crosswalks described above to map each health care market 
to the MSA in which all or the majority of the market is located. Similarly, for the state-
level information, I used the crosswalks to map each health care market to the state in 
which all or the majority of the market is located. 
To identify a set of independent logistic regression variables that were not 
collinear for each health care market regression, I started with the list of independent 
variables identified in Table 2.2, and ran a series of linear regressions for each health care 
market definition to identify and remove the independent variables that introduced 
xxxiv Centroids are defined by the latitude and longitude coordinates at the geometric 
center of each zip code. 
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collinearity in the model. xxxv When collinear variables were identified, I retained the 
independent variable that was likely to be most important in determining RHC location in 
health care markets, and removed the other independent variable from the future runs of 
the linear regression model. For example, in the first linear regression for all health care 
market definitions, the Median Household Income and Persons in Poverty variables each 
had a proportion of variation larger than 0. 70 for the eigenvector with the largest 
condition index, while all other independent variables had a proportion of variation less 
than 0.50.xxxvi,61 Because my conceptual framework identifies the percent of persons in 
poverty as having more influence over RHC location than median household income, I 
removed Median Household Income from the analysis. I then ran a new linear regression 
with the remaining independent variables and repeated the process of identifying and 
removing collinear parameters until two criteria were met for the eigenvector with the 
largest condition index: the condition index was less than 10 and only one parameter had 
a proportion of variation larger than 0.50. 
xxxv The first regression for each health care market included all variables listed in Table 
2.2. Using the results of that regression, I identified the two variables with the largest 
degree of collinearity based on the condition index. Specifically, I identified the two 
parameters with a proportion of variation that was 0.50 or larger for the eigenvector with 
the largest condition index. 
xxxvi The condition index is the square root of the ratio of the largest eigenvalue to each 
individual eigenvalue. Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980) suggest that dependencies 
among the regression independent variables (collinearity) may affect the parameter 
estimates at a condition index of 10 or more. The variance inflation factor, which I only 
used as additional information when identifying variables with the highest degree of 
collinearity, is an index that measures how much the variance of each parameter estimate 
is inflated due to collinearity among the regression independent variables. 
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Because I conducted the collinearity analysis separately for each health care 
market definition, it was possible to identify a different set of final parameters for each 
health care market definition. Nonetheless, I found it reasonable to try to keep the final 
set of variables somewhat consistent across all health care market definitions by 
identifying variables for removal when the criteria for identifying collinear parameters 
were very nearly met, and thus allowed two exceptions to the criteria as discussed below. 
Each health care market definition required either two or three regressions in a series to 
arrive at a model without collinear parameters. Table 2.3 shows the parameters removed 
in each regression in the series for each of the health care market definitions. 
Table 2.3 Variables Removed during Collinearity Analysis by Health Care Market 
Model County MSA HSA HRR Number 
1 Median Median Median Median Household Income Household Income Household Income Household Income 
2 Persons in Poverty Persons in Poverty a Persons in Poverty Persons in Poverty 
3 Unemployment NA Unemployment NA Rate Rateb 
Notes: 
a Persons in Poverty removed due to near collinearity with a combination of other parameters, 
including Persons Eligible for Medicaid; a combination that was found to meet the definition 
of collinearity in all other health care market analyses. 
b Unemployment Rate removed due to near collinearity with Persons Eligible for Medicaid; a 
combination that was found to meet the definition of collinearity in the County health care 
market analysis. 
The Median Household Income was the first variable to be removed due to 
collinearity with Persons in Poverty for all health care market definitions. Persons in 
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Poverty was removed next due to collinearity with Persons Eligible for Medicaid for all 
health care market definitions, except MSAs, in which it was removed due to near 
collinearity with a group of three parameters, including Persons Eligible for 
Medicaid.xxxvii Unemployment Rate was removed from the County and HSA analyses due 
to collinearity with Percent Medicaid Eligible in the county analysis, and near 
collinearity in the HSA analyses.xxxviii 
Given that the process for removing collinear variables was very similar for each 
of the health care market definitions, I believe the geographic regression models to be 
fairly robust and expect any differences in results by health care market to be attributed to 
differences in the characteristics of each health care market definition. 
In the next section, I present the parameter estimates for each independent 
variable for the county health care market logistic regression and identify independent 
variables that are significantly associated with RHC location. Given the focus on NPs as 
the most common health care provider in RHCs, I also present summary results 
describing the impact of removing the number of NPs per capita variable from the model. 
To explain the relative strength of association of RHC location with each factor in the 
model, I calculated the change in probability of RHC location in a county health care 
xxxvii In this run of the linear regression model for MSA health care markets, the 
eigenvector with the largest condition index had four parameters with a significant 
proportion of variation: Persons in Poverty had the largest proportion of variation, 0.69, 
while Persons without Health Insurance, Persons Eligible for Medicaid, and Wage Index 
had proportions of variation of 0.42, 0.39, and 0.30, respectively. 
xxxviii In this run of the linear regression model for HSA health care markets, the 
eigenvector with the largest condition index had a proportion of variation of 0.48 for 
Unemployment Rate and 0.82 for Persons Eligible for Medicaid. 
market associated with the change from the 25th to 75th percentile for each continuous 
independent variable, or with the change from a "No" to a "Yes" value for each binary 
independent variable. Finally, I present the odds ratios for each independent variable in 
the logistic regressions for each of the four different health care market definitions. 
Results 
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The 1,546 RHCs in my analysis were distributed among 400 of the 3,143 counties 
in the U.S. Table 2.4 describes the distribution of RHCs in county health care markets. 
Table 2.4 Number of RHCs in County Health Care Markets 
Number of RHCs per County: 0 1 2 to 5 6 to 10 11 to 20 21+ 
Number of Counties: 2,743 168 160 34 33 5 
Table 2.5 shows the results of the logistic regression assessing the association of 
each factor with RHC location in county health care markets, of which 400 had at least 
one RHC in operation and 2,743 had no RHCs in operation. This regression had a c-
statistic of 0.892 indicating a very strong concordance, or a high degree of accuracy in 
the model's ability to predict the outcome variable. For each independent variable in the 
logistic regression, Table 2.5 shows the parameter estimate and p-value resulting from the 
regression as well as the unit of measurement, median value (or mean value for binary 
variables), and standard deviation of each independent variable among county health care 
markets. Factors with a significant association with RHC location at the five percent level 
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are shaded in the table such that independent variables that had a positive association are 
shaded dark grey and independent variables that had a negative association are shaded in 
light grey. Non-shaded independent variables did not have a significant association with 
RHC location in county health care markets. 
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Table 2.5 Parameter Estimates of Factors Associated with RHCs Located in County Markets 
Independent Variable 
Intercept 
Fepeta.ny···QtiaJified"fie 
·· oent~rs :: ";~:··· .. · •.. · \· .. :: 
Emergency Department 
Visits 
State Business Tax Climate 
Index 
Wage Index 
Unit of Median I 
Measurement Mean b 
Per person 0.37 
Index value 5.02 [0 -10] 
Index value 0.90 
Yes/No 0.67 b 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.38 
0.75 
0.13 
NA 
Parameter 
Estimate 
1.82 
0.28 
-0.03 
0.84 
0.05 
P-Value 
0.059 
... -:.: ~--. 
0.175 
0.816 
0.122 
0.762 
Notes: 
a Dark shaded cells indicate positive association and light shaded cells indicate negative 
association at the 5 % level of significance between each factor and RHC location in county 
health care markets. Non-shaded cells are not significantly associated with RHC location in 
county health care markets. 
b Value shows the proportion of counties with a "Yes" value for binary (Yes I No) independent 
variables. 
Table 2.5 shows that the majority of the factors-11 of the 18-included in the 
final logistic model had a significant positive or negative association with RHCs being 
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located in a county health care market. The population-based demand factors showed that 
RHC location in a county was significantly associated with higher population density; 
lower percentages of people eligible for Medicaid or eligible for Medicare; and a lower 
percent of Medicare eligible beneficiaries enrolled in Medicare Part D. Only the percent 
of people under 65 who do not have health insurance did not have a significant 
association with RHC location in a county. 
Several of the factors related to the supply of primary care and other health 
services were significantly associated with RHC location in a county. RHCs were more 
likely to be located in counties that are not designated as primary care shortage areas; 
counties with fewer physician assistants, rural health clinics, and federally qualified 
health centers per capita; and counties. with more nurse practitioners, and licensed 
pharmacists. The results showed no association between RHC location and the state 
business tax climate index, the wage index, or per capita numbers of primary care 
physicians, home health agencies, or emergency department visits. 
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RHCs were less likely to be located in counties where NPs have authority to 
diagnose, treat, and refer patients independently of a physician. In a separate regression, 
in which I replaced NP authority to diagnose, treat and refer patients with NP authority to 
prescribe medications, NP prescriptive authority was found to also have a significant, 
even stronger negative association with RHC location (parameter estimate -1.75, p-value 
<0.001). Conversely, NP designation as a Medicaid PCP had no impact on RHC location. 
Finally, I tested the effect of removing the variable for number of NPs per capita 
in order to assess the impact on the associations between RHC location and other model 
factors. For the nearly all of the factors in the model, the significance was the same and 
the parameter estimate was within 0.1 of the estimate produced in the full model. Two 
factors, the number of primary care physicians (0.01, p-value 0.001) and emergency 
department visits per capita (0.44, p-value 0.02), showed a significant association with 
RHC location after removing the number of NPs per capita, though the size of each 
factor's parameter estimates increased only a small amount. Thus, I fmd these results 
robust to the exclusion of the number of NPs per capita. 
For each independent variable, table 2.6 shows the marginal probability, or the 
change in probability that an RHC is located in a county associated with the change of a 
particular independent variable when all other independent variables are held constant at 
their median value, or for binary independent variables, their mean value. For binary 
independent variables, the change in RHC location probability was measured as a switch 
from "No" to "Yes" value for the variable. For continuous independent variables, the 
change in RHC location probability was measured from the 25th percentile to the 75th 
percentile of all county values. 
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Table 2.6 RHC Location Marginal Probability for Each Factor 
Independent Variable 
Emergency Department 
Visits 
State Business Tax Climate 
Index 
Wage Index 
NP Authorized to be 
Medicaid PCP 
·. NP5ag:&actice-·' Itlilepen:Cie~tly : : .. ::., 
Unit of 
Per person 
Index value 
[0 -10] 
Index value 
Yes/No 
Median/ 
Meanb 
0.37 
5.02 
0.90 
0.67 b 
Marginal 
Probability c 
% ofMean 
RHC Prob. ct 
~~~~-=~~~ 
0.010 7.96% 
-0.002 -1.80% 
0.016 12.79% 
0.005 3.66% 
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Notes: 
a Dark shaded cells indicate positive association and light shaded cells indicate negative 
association at the 5 % level of significance between each factor and RHC location in county 
health care markets. Non-shaded cells are not significantly associated with RHC location in 
county health care markets. 
b Value shows the proportion of counties with a "Yes" value for binary (Yes I No) independent 
variables. 
c For binary independent variables, the marginal probability represents the change in RHC 
location associated with a switch from "No" to "Yes" value for the variable. For continuous 
independent variables, the marginal probability represents the change in RHC location 
probability associated with a change from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile of all 
county values. 
d The percent of mean RHC probability is the percent marginal probability for each 
independent variable of the mean probability of RHC location across all counties: marginal 
probability I 0.127. 
The marginal probability analysis shows that the demand characteristics of the 
population had generally expected effects on the probability that an RHC is located in a 
particular county. Increasing the population density of a county from the 25th to 75th 
percentile increased the probability of RHC location by only 1.32 percent, while a similar 
change in persons eligible for Medicare, Medicaid, and enrollment in Medicare Part D 
had a larger effect and decreased the probability of RHC location between 32.64 and 
50.22 percent. 
Provider supply factors had varied effects on the probability that an RHC is 
located in a particular county. Some of the largest changes in RHC probability were for 
factors that are correlated with rural county status and showed that RHCs are less likely 
to be located in primary care health professional shortage counties ( -36.86 percent) and 
counties with more rural health clinics ( -67.54 percent). More modest changes in RHC 
probability showed that RHC location is associated with counties that had fewer PAs (-
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23.99 percent) or federally qualified health centers per capita ( -25.27 percent), but more 
NPs (31.58 percent) and licensed pharmacists per capita (21.05 percent). The number of 
per capita primary care physicians, home health agencies, and emergency department 
visits, as well as the state business tax index and wage index did not have significant 
effects on RHC location. 
Finally, whether NPs are authorized to be a Medicaid PCP did not have a 
significant effect on RHC location, but the ability of NPs to practice independently of a 
physician had a moderate negative effect ( -36.06 percent) on the probability of an RHC 
being located in a county. In a separate regression I replaced NP practice authority with 
NP authority to prescribe medication independently and found the latter had a strong 
negative effect ( -78.82 percent) on the probability of an RHC being located in a county. 
The small size and geographic basis of counties makes them a good choice for 
health care market definition when analyzing factors associated with RHC location. At 
the same time, assessing whether these associations are consistent for analyses based on 
MSA, HSA, and HRR health care market definitions provides an important sensitivity 
analysis with regard to the dependence of the results on the health care market defmition. 
Table 2.7 shows the odds ratios and 95 percent confidence intervals for all independent 
variables for all four health care market definitions, with significantly positive 
associations shaded in dark grey and significantly negative associations shaded in light 
grey. 
In general, the analysis of RHC location and factor associations across the four 
health care market definitions identified some important trends as well as a two 
inconsistencies compared to the results based on counties. These inconsistencies persist 
even after taking into account the effect of factors being based on different geographic 
areas. Most of the factors are based on county-level data, except the MSA-based wage 
index and the state-based state business tax climate index, NP Medicaid PCP 
authorization, and NP practice and prescriptive authority. 
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Comparing the results across analyses based on different health care markets 
shows a reduction in specificity of factors based on county-level data as those factors 
were aggregated to the larger MSA and HRR health care market definitions, and as those 
factors were mapped imperfectly to HSAs and HR.Rs through the underlying zip codes. 
These two trends explained most of the differences in results across health care market 
definitions for factors based on county-level data. One exception is the number of rural 
health clinics per capita factor, which had a positive association when measured at larger 
MSA-level, but a negative association with RHC location when measured at the smaller 
county and HSA-levels. 
Significant results were found for one of the other health care markets for primary 
care physicians per capita, the state business tax climate index, the wage index, and 
whether NPs could be authorized to be a Medicaid PCP. Results for these factors varied 
across health care markets and were not significant for health care markets that 
correspond most accurately to the data. Therefore, I believe these results are likely due to 
random variation in the source data. 
The three NP regulation factors were based on state-level data. The ability of NPs 
to both practice and prescribe medication independently of a physician were associated 
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with lower probability of RHC location in a health care market across all health care 
market definitions, except HRRs. I believe the insignificant results for HRR markets were 
likely due to poor correspondence with the source data and aggregation of the factors 
across state lines. 
Finally, the c-statistics for each health care market analysis support my conclusion 
that the county-based analysis provides the most accurate results, particularly for the 
county-level factors. The increased precision was likely provided by both a smaller 
observation size and the perfect correspondence with all source data. However, the results 
of analyses based on other health care market definitions highlight an inconsistent result 
for rural health care clinics per capita. 
Ta
bl
e 
2.
7 
O
dd
s R
at
io
s 
fo
r F
ac
to
rs
 A
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
ith
 R
H
C
 L
oc
at
io
n 
by
 H
ea
lth
 C
ar
e 
M
ar
ke
t 
H
ea
lth
 C
ar
e M
ar
ke
t 
C
ou
nt
y 
(c 
=
 0.
89
2) 
M
SA
 (c
 = 
0.
79
1) 
H
SA
 (c
 =
 0.
86
0) 
H
R
R
 (c
 =
 0.
84
4) 
#M
ar
ke
ts
 R
H
C
 I 
N
o 
R
H
C
 
40
0/
2,
74
3 
15
8/
25
1 
55
7 
I 2
,8
77
 
17
0/
13
6 
O
dd
s 
95
%
 C
on
f. 
In
te
rv
al
 
R
at
io
 
In
te
rv
al
 
R
at
io
 
In
te
rv
al
 
R
at
io
 
In
te
rv
al
 
95
%
 C
on
f. 
O
dd
s 
In
de
pe
nd
en
t V
ar
ia
bl
e 
O
dd
s 
95
%
 C
on
f. 
O
dd
s 
95
%
 C
on
f. 
Po
pu
la
tio
n 
D
en
si
ty
 
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t R
at
e,
 a
ge
 1
6+
 
N
A
 
N
A
 
N
A
 
1.
08
3 
0.
94
5 
1.
24
2 
N
A
 
N
A
 
N
A
 
1.
18
4 
0.
89
3 
1.
31
6 
Pe
rs
on
s E
lig
ib
le
 fo
r M
ed
ic
ai
d 
I.; ';
q':;
Q6
2l 
:9~~
4q j
s': 
o:9,
~41 
m
 
().9
3~.ii.
·: g)
77j
i~·
~·~S
l :0
g.9
78V
o~~.
?§'[
1 ~.:g.
93?.
l"~'P
·§ii
i'r 
pi§
541
.k ''o
;9
89
 
Pe
rs
on
s 
El
ig
ib
le
 fo
r M
ed
ic
ar
e 
1 ''·q
·,90q
_:l,lo
,Wl
~ J·;
.0
.9
3,
SI
 
0.
93
81
 
0.
87
0 
I 1
.0
10
 I':)P
·~~4
J:. 
·o~8
31.J
 '·Q.
§~.5
 .. 1 
0.
89
5 
I 
0.
79
8 
I 
1.
00
3 
En
ro
llm
en
t i
n 
M
ed
ic
ar
e P
ar
t D
 
I i.Q
,962
.;I··,.
q,9
~g.J
·;~·
~74
1 0
.9
93
1 
0.
96
41
 
1.0
221
.·.0;
·~'7
<1I
R~~
~'L
:l,:o:9
881
 1
.0
07
1 
0.
97
0 
I 
1.
04
6 
Pe
rs
on
s 
<6
5 
w
/o
 H
ea
lth
 In
su
ra
nc
e 
I 
0.
98
3 
I 
0.
95
5 
I 
1.
01
11
 
0.
99
11
 
0.
92
61
 
1.
06
11
 
1.
01
21
 
0.
98
7 
I 
1.
03
71
 
1.
00
8 
I 
0.
92
71
 
1.
09
6 
PC
 H
ea
lth
 P
ro
fe
ss
io
na
l S
ho
rta
ge
 
lr''g
.:~.O
s·]' 
; 9.~.
5§ I
'Co
.
'8d
81
 
0.
98
9 
I 
0.
52
8 
I 
1.
84
91
 
0.
98
8 
I 
0.
76
2 
I 
1.
28
31
 
1.
23
6 
I 
0.
54
5 
1 
2.
80
6 
Pr
im
ar
y 
C
ar
e 
Ph
ys
ic
ia
ns
 
1.
oo
31
 
o
.9
98
1 
1.
oo
8 
f'::o
,9sq
l 9
..:9§£
1i o
:Q9
s• 
1.
00
11
 
o
.9
95
1 
1.
oo
71
 
o
.9
91
1 
o
.9
67
1 
1.
01
1 
Ph
ys
ic
ia
n 
A
ss
is
ta
nt
s 
w
ith
 N
PI
 
''g.
9k
t "
 
0.
98
4 
0.
96
8 
N
ur
se
 P
ra
ct
iti
on
er
s w
ith
 N
PI
 
i$lJ:
ai;
'" 
Li
ce
ns
ed
 P
ha
rm
ac
is
ts
 
t.~~~
a-~ 
;1tRr
~¢.
j ;;~1 'i
tr.~
q9 .
..
.
.
 ,
 
..
..
..
..
. 
..
..
 
H
om
e 
H
ea
lth
 A
ge
nc
ie
s 
0.
97
8 
0.
94
5 
1.
01
2 
0.
92
9 
0.
82
6 
1.
04
5 
1.
00
0 
0.
97
0 
1.
03
0 
0.
91
3 
0.
80
2 
1.
04
0 
R
ur
al
 H
ea
lth
 C
lin
ic
s 
•. 
'0.
87
'Z
I:
.
o
.s
s9
l: 
o.9
18l
·,;i,
if4?
ro·L
93v
·:l::;~
l:~~
~:l 
O
.s5
3:
l··
o
.8
o9
i ..
 
'o
.8
99
1 
1.
01
1
1 
o
.9
12
1 
1.
25
9 
FQ
 H
ea
lth
 C
en
te
rs
 
·
 
p.
Qo
21
.
·
.
Q,
ss-
5l
·
'
o
.9
s:
tl 
o
.9
83
1 
o
.8
69
l 
u
1
2
l 
o
:9o
41
 
:o
;ss
tl' 
·
O.
Q6
ol 
o
.8
74
1 
o
.
71
91
 
L0
63
 
Em
er
ge
nc
y 
D
ep
ar
tm
en
t V
is
its
 
1.3
21
 I 
0.
88
3 
I 
1.
97
51
 
0.
76
7 
I 
0.
10
9 
I 
5.
39
81
 
1.
53
4 
I 
0.
77
9 
I 
3.
02
21
 
0.
89
9 
I 
0.
08
6 
I 
9.
43
7 
St
at
e B
us
in
es
s T
ax
 C
lim
at
e 
In
de
x 
o
.9
75
l 
o
.7
85
l 
1.
21
01
 
1.
00
21
 
o
.6
6o
l 
L
51
9l
t.
2,
47
J .
.
 t0
3~I
';L4
99
1 
o
.9
28
1 
o
.5
51
1 
1.
56
3 
W
ag
e 
In
de
x 
2.
31
71
 
o
.7
99
1 
6.
71
81
 
o
.2
69
1 
o
.o
28
1 
2.
63
11
 
o
.4
36
l 
o
.
18
4l
 
L03
1I
'()~
o~2
1 
o
.q
o6
l.
o
:6
t8
·
 
N
P 
A
ut
ho
riz
ed
 to
 b
e 
M
ed
ic
ai
d 
PC
P 
1.
04
9 
I 
0. 
76
9 
I 
1.
43
21
 
0:~
42
. I : Q
~3q
l"
. ,0
.9
75
 I 
0.
95
7 
I 
0. 
71
1 
I 
1.
28
81
 
0.
57
6 
I 
0.
28
5 
I 
1' 
16
5 
-
.
.
.
l 
0 
N
P 
c
a
n
 P
ra
ct
ic
e 
In
de
pe
nd
en
tly
 
l:o
.Ro
si·
 
.
.
 Q.~
58l
 o
.
8t
li ..
 
J>5
o~I
,Qi
295
l·
o~8i
76.l
 Jl
§lZ
I'
OA
7fl
:'·q
.78
61 
o.
752
1 
o.
379
1 
1.4
93 
N
P 
ca
n
 P
re
sc
rib
e 
In
de
pe
nd
en
tly
 a 
.
O.J
7L
fj ... O
J0
7.l
 ,Q~
7§~i
'l
-o:?
tzl
··.o:t
~6l
·:o.
669
l 0
.~o5
J,o
.~p4
1. 
pA
57
1 
o.
581
1 
o.
25
ol 
1.3
48 
N
ot
es
: 
a 
NP
 c
a
n
 P
re
sc
ri
be
 In
de
pe
nd
en
tly
 w
as
 a
n
al
yz
ed
 in
 a 
se
pa
ra
te
 re
gr
es
si
on
 m
o
de
l, 
in
 w
hi
ch
 it
 re
pl
ac
ed
 N
P 
c
a
n
 P
ra
ct
ic
e 
In
de
pe
nd
en
tly
. A
ll 
re
su
lts
 w
e
re
 
v
er
y 
si
m
ila
r f
or
 th
e 
tw
o 
re
gr
es
si
on
s.
 
-
.
.
.
.
) 
,_
_
. 
72 
Limitations and Notes 
While county-level analysis provides a fair amount of the market-level 
information that is necessary to make an accurate assessment of the factors associated 
with RHC location, the market in which an individual RHC operates is likely a 
neighborhood or geographic area that is almost certainly much smaller than an entire 
county. Due to limitations in the availability of information measured by the independent 
variables, an analysis of a smaller health care market, such as by zip code, is not possible. 
Nonetheless, the county-level analysis provides valuable information that is not 
nationally available for smaller geographic areas. The likely effect of using county health 
care markets as the basis of the analysis is a decrease in the precision of the results, such 
that I would expect an analysis using more precise RHC health care markets (i.e., an 
analysis using a smaller geographic area as the basis for the analysis) would increase the 
accuracy of estimates of association between individual factors and RHC location. 
In general, regulations applied to a market may be endogenous to the participation 
decisions of regulated entities within a particular market. However, I have treated 
regulations limiting the ability of NP practice authority and Medicaid authorization as 
exogenous to the market participation decisions of RHCs because 1) the majority of state 
regulations limiting the ability of NP practice were in place prior to the first major period 
of RHC growth (starting in 2006), 2) the state of these regulations has remained fairly 
constant, and 3) RHCs are at least one organizational step removed from NPs affected by 
these regulations. Given these temporal and organizational distinctions, I believe the 
exogenous treatment of regulations affecting NPs in this analysis is appropriate, though 
the possibility of endogeneity in this relationship is difficult to rule out with absolute 
certainty. 
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The majority of independent variables are based on county, MSA, and state-level 
information, and thus have geographic boundaries that align perfectly with county and 
most MSA health care markets. However, HSAs and HRRs are based on zip codes and 
thus are not aligned with county, MSA, and state boundaries. As a result, analyses of 
HSA and HRR health care markets lack the level of precision provided by analyses based 
on county or MSA health care markets. None of the major findings of this study depend 
only on results from HSA or HRR analyses. 
Discussion and Future Research 
As new modes of limited-service health care delivery are introduced, it is 
important to investigate how their development is influenced by population demand and 
provider supply factors, and to assess the impact of regulations affecting new service 
models. The results of this chapter confirm prior findings about the characteristics of 
populations who live near RHCs, provide quantitative information about the potential for 
substitution among primary care providers, and confirm the extent to which RHCs 
increase access to primary care. 
Demand factors indicate that RHC location is associated with a higher population 
density and a larger share of the population with private insurance. The latter conclusion 
is based on the consistent negative association between RHC location and all non-
privately insured populations (e.g., Medicare, Medicaid, and uninsured persons). These 
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demand factor results may also indicate a positive association between RHCs and health 
care markets with higher socioeconomic status. RHCs are negatively associated with 
larger proportions of Medicaid eligible persons, a factor found to be highly correlated 
with higher rates of persons in poverty and lower median household income. xxxix While 
these results show a negative association with Medicaid eligible persons, Mehrotra and 
Lave also show that Medicaid beneficiaries account for very small proportion of patients 
seen at RHCs. 62 Medicaid insurance is accepted at most RHC chains, but the location of 
RHCs in wealthier neighborhoods within a county may account for this difference. 
Finally, the association with higher levels of private insurance may also provide some 
context about the type of primary care RHCs are providing. Higher levels of private 
insurance also signify a population that is more likely to seek primary care for acute, 
independent illnesses rather than for management of chronic conditions. 
Associations between RHC location and most of the significant supply factors 
seem to be driven by RHCs' tendency to be located in more densely populated areas, 
rather than in rural areas. Densely-populated areas increase the total benefit provided by 
RHCs' convenient walk-in services compared to traditional PCP scheduling, given the 
relatively short travel distance to an RHC for the majority of people. Longer travel 
distances in rural areas somewhat mitigate this convenience. One of the strongest supply 
factor influences is the negative association between RHC location and primary care 
xxxix These results were found in the collinearity analysis, which showed higher 
proportions of Medicaid population to be positively correlated with higher proportions of 
persons in poverty and to be negatively correlated with higher median household income 
levels. 
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health professional shortage counties, which have fewer primary care providers per 
capita. This result compliments other research that suggests that RHCs improve access to 
primary care in the health care markets where they operate;31 however, it also shows that 
RHCs tend not to expand primary care access to health care markets with a shortage of 
primary care providers. 
While the association between RHC location and the demand and supply factors 
was generally consistent with other literature, the results showing no or negative 
association between RHC location and NP regulations were not expected. The operation 
of most RHCs depends on care provided by NPs, and it therefore seems logical that 
regulations that limit NP practice and prescribing authority, which have been in existence 
prior to 2006, would also restrict RHC development in those locations, the majority of 
which occurred since 2006.x1,63•64 However, the results of this analysis show that health 
care markets in states that allow NPs more practice and prescribing authority, tend to be 
less likely to have RHCs. In fact, the negative association between NP regulations and 
RHC location exists in concert with the positive association with more NPs per capita, as 
well as when the number of NPs per capita is excluded from the model. While a logical 
next step is to consider factors confounding the association between of NP regulations 
and RHC location, it is difficult to identify a factor that would produce such a consistent 
negative association. 
Data from the AHRF show that NPs provide care in a majority of counties in the 
xl The few regulatory changes that have occurred since 2006 resulted in reduced 
regulatory burden on NPs. 
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U.S.-more than 90 percent of all counties had NPs in 2011-and there is little 
difference in the distribution of NPs in states with and without regulations limiting NP 
practice authority. Of the 2,024 counties in states with regulations limiting NP practice 
authority, there was an average of 40 NPs per county (range 0 to 2,058, standard 
deviation 130), while there was an average of 36 NPs per county (range 0 to 1,602, 
standard deviation 118) for the 1,119 counties in states without such regulations. 
Thus, one possibility given the findings of this chapter is that the negative 
association between regulations affecting NPs and RHC location reflects a symbiosis 
between a more highly regulated NP work environment and the organizing capacity of 
RHC chains to employ NPs more efficiently. xu fu states with NP regulations, RHC chains 
have likely developed protocols and an administrative structure to manage regulatory 
barriers and employ NPs with greater efficiency than NPs could otherwise be employed 
in those states. Specifically, NP coordination with physicians, including documented 
supervision or physician chart reviews, could be inade uniform across RHC locations and 
conducted with greater efficiency as physicians are able to coordinate across several 
RHCs affiliated with the same chain organization. fu states that require oversight over 
prescribing authority, the physician coordination and access to retail pharmacies provided 
by RHC employment could alleviate delays NPs that may otherwise experience in 
securing prescriptions and refills for their patients. Finally, RHC affiliation is likely to 
streamline and reduce NPs burden of addressing variable billing and reimbursement 
xli Further research into this possible explanation of results would need to consider RHCs' 
employment rates of NPs versus other primary care provider types in states with and 
without such regulations. 
policies across many insurers. In states that do not have regulatory limitations on NP 
practices, RHCs would not have the same opportunity to alleviate such regulatory 
barriers. The potential for RHC organizations to more efficiently employ NPs in health 
care markets with NP regulations is one explanation of the finding of a negative 
association between NP regulations and RHC location. 
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Finally, RHCs may improve coordination with a patient's PCP compared to NP-
provided care in other practices. One motivating factor for regulations limiting the ability 
of NPs to practice independently of a physician is to limit the extent of uncoordinated 
care between a patient's primary care providers. Some RHC chains coordinate care with 
PCPs by offering to send RHC-visit medical records to a patient's PCP or emailing 
records to the patient and allowing the patient to share records with their PCP. 
Coordination of medical records could limit problems, reduce duplicate diagnostic tests 
and lab exams, and allow physicians to better track medications and thereby reduce drug 
dose and interaction problems. 
Over the next few years, the number of RHCs is expected to grow rapidly and 
more states are likely to repeal regulations limiting NP practice autonomy, prescribing 
authority, and reimbursement authority. I expect that NP regulations are not likely to play 
a significant role in determining where RHC development occurs in the United States. 
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3. Geographic Factors Mfecting Specialization in Hospital Services 
Introduction 
Specialization among health care providers has been a mainstay of the modern 
health care industry, developing in concert with increases in health knowledge and 
improvements in technology. The division of labor into more specialized tasks has 
continued to expand the number of health care provider types and increased the depth of 
understanding of health conditions as well as new procedures and techniques to treat 
them. This process has improved treatment efficacy and addressed new health care needs. 
Recently, specialization of health care providers has increasingly focused on the 
organizational form and the scope and scale of services provided. Prime examples of this 
trend include the increase in single specialty hospitals (SSHs), which focus on a limited 
set of inpatient cardiac or orthopedic/surgical procedures, and ambulatory surgery centers 
(ASCs), which focus on a limited set of outpatient surgical services. Both health care 
provider types seek to refine delivery through repetition over a large volume of services 
based on the belief that a limited-scope and large-scale will improve quality of care and 
reduce the cost of providing care. 
Although there is dispute over whether either provider type has succeeded at these 
goals, 6•9•10•11 •65•66•67•68•69 it is nonetheless important to understand the market conditions 
that have supported such specialization in services as well as the conditions that may 
limit the extent of specialization. The majority of SSHs and ASCs are owned at least in 
part by physicians who refer patients to their own facility. Physician-owners receive 
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payment for their surgical services as well as a share of profits from facility fees paid to 
the SSH or ASC. A Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedP AC) survey found 
that physicians' motivation in setting up SSHs was based on opportunities for 
organizational control and for increased income that are not available in general 
hospitals.1 Physician-owners of SSHs commented heavily on frustrations with general 
hospital management, and administrators of competing general hospital acknowledged 
that they had been slow to react to physician issues. The incentives for physician 
ownership of ASCs are similar given their tendency to be independent facilities that offer 
opportunities for physicians to increase their income through services rendered as well as 
facility ownership.70 
Motivated by an interest in greater organizational control and the potential for 
profits, physician-owners sought out new models focused on improving care. However, 
such specialization has limitations. When discussing the division of labor, Adam Smith 
focused on the extent of the market as being the main limiting factor of specialization. 15 
The number of workers or amount of knowledge available creates limits to the fineness of 
the tasks that can be conducted and therefore provides an inherent limit to the degree of 
specialization. Becker and Murphy (1992) take issue with this point and claim that the 
costs of coordinating more specialized workers in the market present an even greater 
limitation to the degree of specialization.71 They cite principal-agent conflicts, the 
potential for free-riding, and difficulties in communication as the major limitations on the 
extent of specialization in a market. When assessing specialization of physicians working 
in the market for hospital services, Smith's view would focus on limitations in the 
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number of physicians and hospitals in the market, while Becker and Murphy would focus 
more on the cost of working in a more complex labor market, the potential to provide 
unnecessary or duplicative services, and the increased difficulty in coordinating patient 
medical histories and educating patients about treatment options and plans. 
SSHs and ASCs provide an example market on which to investigate these 
competing theories of the limits of specialization. Yet, at the start of the investigation, 
evidence already demonstrates that these specialty providers produce costs in the market 
that result from coordination of multiple specialty providers. In particular, evidence 
shows that SSHs and ASCs cherry-pick the most profitable patients by focusing on 
patients with less severe illness and avoiding patients with less generous insurance 
coverage (Medicaid or health maintenance organization plans)2•72•73•74 and implement 
referral practices that lead to overutilization of services.4•5•72•75 Concern over these 
externalities have become so great that Congress introduced a moratorium on new SSHs 
between 2003 and 2006 and later effectively capped the extent of physician-ownership of 
SSHs in 2010. These specialty hospital providers have clearly introduced coordination 
costs into the market, and as a result of the Congress' response to such actions, growth in 
SSHs has been limited. However, these developments do not preclude the extent of the 
market from also introducing some limitation on the degree of specialization in hospital 
services. 
This chapter addresses the market for hospital services, in which specialization 
has produced coordinating cost externalities, and analyzes the effect of the extent of the 
market on the degree of specialization to examine the sources of limitations on 
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specialization. Given the effect these specialty providers have had on the delivery of 
hospital services, and the increasing emphasis on using provider competitions to control 
health care costs, it is likely that new models of specialization will develop and new 
coordination strategies will be needed.76 A better empirical understanding of the limits of 
specialization can encourage efficient levels of specialization in health care markets. 
Background 
Both SSHs and ASCs focus on a limited set of hospital-based services and are 
generally owned, to a large degree, by physicians who refer patients to their own facility. 
SSHs generally offer inpatient cardiac, orthopedic, or general surgical services.xlii ASCs 
offer outpatient surgical services including ophthalmology, orthopedic, gastrointestinal, 
pain management, and other services. Both provider types claim that they improve 
quality and reduce costs by innovating the provision of hospital services to allow 
physician owners to manage hospitals and to focus on a limited set of services. For the 
conditions they treat, cardiac and orthopedic SSHs treat more patients than the median 
general hospital in the same market, but both provider types are much less likely than 
general hospitals to have emergency departments.70•77 
One factor influencing the development of hospitals and ambulatory surgery 
centers occurred long before any significant growth in these facilities occurred. In the 
early 1970s states began requiring the approval of health care capital projects by state 
xlii Background for this chapter overlaps with relevant background from chapter 1 on 
SSHs. 
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health planning agencies before new development could begin. A federal law requiring 
such approval in all states went into effect in 1974. Prior to its repeal in 1987, several 
states developed certificate of need (CON) requirements to address the federal mandate. 
While some states have repealed these requirements, 29 states and the District of 
Columbia currently have a CON requirement for either the expansion of acute hospital 
beds or the development of an ambulatory surgery center. 
The fmancial incentives for physicians to set up specialty hospitals were made 
explicit through an exception to the Stark laws. Stark I and Stark II, enacted in 1989 and 
1993, respectively prohibited physician referrals of Medicare and Medicaid patients for a 
set of designated health services. However, the provisions included an exception for 
physician ownership of whole hospitals as physician ownership of short term general 
acute care hospitals was not found to have adverse effects on access, cost, or use of 
services. The Stark laws were enacted after several studies cited increased utilization at 
physician-owned clinical laboratories, diagnostic imaging centers, and physical therapy 
centers. While investment in whole hospitals is permitted, the Stark laws prohibit 
physicians from having an ownership interest in a hospital subdivision to which they 
refer patients. Critics argue that specialty hospitals and ambulatory surgery centers are 
more similar to hospital subdivisions than traditional full-service hospitals, and therefore 
compromise physician ethics as physician owners may realize inappropriate financial 
gain from self-referral. 
After a significant number of physician-owned SSHs opened in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 
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2003 imposed an 18-month moratorium on the development of new, and the expansion of 
current, specialty hospitals beginning in December 2003. The American Medical 
Association voted to oppose extension of the original moratorium, though the American 
Hospital Association and Federation of American Hospitals wanted the moratorium on 
new specialty hospitals to become permanent. 12 The moratorium, which prohibited new 
specialty hospitals from billing Medicare and prohibited current specialty hospitals from 
expanding beyond defined limits, was extended until August 8, 2006. At that time the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services, as mandated by the Deficit Reduction Act of 
2005, issued a final report to congress with a plan to address physician investment in 
specialty hospitals. 
Mter several years of uncertainty about the ability of physician-owners to self-
refer Medicare and Medicaid patients to SSHs and ASCs, the Patient Protection and 
Mfordable Care Act of 2010 added restrictions to the whole hospital exception in the 
Stark law. After December 31, 2010, only physician-owned hospitals with a provider 
agreement in place as of that date were allowed to refer Medicare patients to that hospital. 
Existing physician-owned hospitals were prohibited from increasing the percentage of 
physician-ownership in the hospital or expanding the number of beds, operating rooms, 
li"" 
and procedure rooms beyond the level in place on March 23, 2010.x 11 Even though the 
law effectively capped the extent of physician-ownership of these facilities, it also 
ensured a continuing presence for SSHs and ASCs in the market for hospital services. 
xliii Exceptions to the prohibition on expanding the number of beds, operating rooms, and 
procedure rooms may be made for hospitals based on population growth and Medicaid 
admissions. 
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Framework 
Becker and Murphy (1992) developed a model of specialization that assesses the 
extent of division of labor based on coordination costs, the extent of the market, and the 
amount of knowledge among the workers in the market.71 Their model builds on Adam 
Smith's model of division of labor, which explains the endogenous relationship between 
specialization and greater depth of knowledge in an industry. While Smith claims that the 
degree of specialization is limited mainly by the extent, or size, of the market, Becker and 
Murphy explain that the degree of specialization is more dependent on the costs of 
coordinating additional groups of specialized workers in the market. 
This paper attempts to better understand limitations on specialization and evaluate 
the role of market size and coordination costs by using the market for hospital services as 
an example. Yet, it is important to recognize that coordination costs are difficult to 
operationalize in an empirical model. Becker and Murphy identified coordination costs as 
principal-agent conflicts, free-riding, difficulties in communication, and the increased 
importance of contract enforcement and government regulation. In the health care market 
coordination costs may arise when specialists consider their own incentives in addition to 
the overall well-being of the patient or the most efficient sequence of health care services. 
Some costs are difficult to estimate in practice, and may exist in the market, such as 
switching costs between physicians and hospitals, increased complexity of coordinating 
patient health information, and hold-ups as patients queue for specialist types. Other 
significant costs have been shown to exist in the market, including adverse patient 
selection,2•72•73•74 overutilization,4•5•74•75 and increased need for government regulation. 
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This chapter takes as a premise that certain coordination costs resulting from 
specialization in hospital servic~~ are evident in the market and create some limitation on 
the degree of specialization. With this framework I focus my analysis on estimating the 
association between the degree of hospital specialization in a market and factors 
measuring the extent of the market. The size of the market for hospital services can be 
measured by demand factors, including population, population growth, health insurance 
status, and socioeconomics status as well as supply factors including the number of 
specialists, hospital beds, operating rooms, emergency departments, and levels of 
competition for hospital beds and ASCs. Additional market factors I take into account 
include differences in tax levels, differences in market wages, and whether certificate of 
need laws are in place requiring prior approval before developing new hospital beds or 
ASCs. 
While this chapter does not attempt to evaluate whether coordination costs or the 
extent of the market is the greater limiting factor on the degree of specialization in a 
market, it does analyze whether, in the presence of existing coordination costs, market 
size factors are significantly associated with increased specialization in hospital services. 
The increase in hospital services provided through SSHs and ASCs creates a unique basis 
for this analysis given the investment in capital, depth of knowledge, and coordination 
among providers that is required in markets for hospital services. This paper offers 
discussion about how market size may influence the degree of specialization in hospital 
services and offers context for future analysis incorporating coordination costs. 
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Data 
I gathered a list of 140 single-specialty hospitals (SSHs) from two main sources. 
One source of SSHs is a working list used in research conducted by Carey, Burgess, and 
Young,8•19 and the other source is a list of SSHs identified in a 2008 department of Health 
and Human Services Office of Inspector General report.20 .I reconciled the two lists of 
SSHs to generate a set of specialty hospitals that includes 25 cardiac SSHs and 115 
orthopedic/surgical SSHs that are owned at least in part by the physicians who refer 
patients to the hospital and opened prior to 2008. The SSHs included in the final list were 
still open at the time of analysis and have a confirmable zip code.xliv I used the Area 
Health Resource File (AHRF) for 2010 to identify the 4,937 ASCs in 2007 and their 
distribution by county. Table 3.1 shows the distribution of SSHs and ASCs by state. 
xliv While I did not use hospital claims data to identify single specialty hospitals, I used 
the number of hospital beds and information from hospital websites to conclude that all 
hospitals analyzed were generally small hospitals with a singular focus on cardiac, 
orthopedic, or general surgery procedures. 
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Table 3.1 Number of SSHs and ASCs by State 
State Number of SSHs Number of ASCs 
Alaska 0 9 
Alabama 0 36 
Arkansas 5 61 
Arizona 7 148 
California 9 654 
Colorado 1 99 
Connecticut 0 44 
District of Columbia 0 4 
Delaware 0 25 
Florida 0 360 
Georgia 0 249 
Hawaii 0 11 
Iowa 0 24 
Idaho 5 55 
Illinois 0 120 
Indiana 4 124 
Kansas 12 63 
Kentucky 0 35 
Louisiana 19 74 
Massachusetts 0 54 
Maryland 0 353 
Maine 0 17 
Michigan 1 78 
Minnesota 0 48 
Missouri 0 98 
Mississippi 0 64 
Montana 0 15 
North Carolina 1 68 
North Dakota 0 17 
Nebraska 3 44 
Nevada 1 50 
New Hampshire 0 21 
New Jersey 0 201 
New Mexico 1 21 
New York 0 87 
Ohio 6 191 
Oklahoma 11 51 
Oregon 1 76 
Pennsylvania 1 218 
Rhode Island 0 7 
South Carolina 0 61 
South Dakota 8 16 
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Tennessee 0 146 
Texas 39 343 
Utah 2 43 
Virginia 0 48 
Vermont 0 0 
Washington 0 221 
Wisconsin 3 57 
West Virginia 0 11 
Wyoming 0 17 
Total 140 4,937 
Next, I gathered data from several sources to identify factors that assess the extent 
of the market for hospital services, including population-level demand and provider 
supply factors, and information on state regulations as well as the relative wage and tax 
costs in each market. Population demand characteristics include the total population, 
population growth rate, and the health insurance and income status of people living in 
each health care market. Factors affecting provider supply include the per capita number 
of active medical doctors (MDs), surgical specialists, acute hospital beds, operating 
rooms, emergency departments, and an Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for hospital 
and ASC market competition. Additional factors affecting provider supply include the 
relative tax burden, the relative wage costs in each health care market, and two different 
state-based CON laws, one focused on acute hospital beds and the other focused on 
ambulatory surgery centers. The specific variables and data sources are listed in Table 
3.2. 
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The AHRF is a county-level dataset compiled from several sources by the Health 
Resources and Services Administration.xlv In addition to information on ASCs described 
above, I used several variables from the 2010 AHRF dataset in my analysis, most of 
which represents 2007 values for the variables used, though some variables represent 
slightly different values when a value for 2007 was not available. The variable 
quantifying the number of persons eligible for Medicaid represents data from 2005, 
which were the most recent data available in the AHRF.xlvi I incorporated AHRF 
variables in my analysis that assess the population health insurance status, income status, 
and health care utilization as well as the number of health care providers by type. 
To assess the cost of providing health care in each health care market, I used the 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) hospital wage index (WI) in my 
analysis. CMS calculates the WI annually based on a survey of wages and wage-related 
costs of short-term, acute care hospitals and uses it to adjust Medicare reimbursement 
levels to most provider types for differences in market wages at the metropolitan 
statistical area (MSA) level. 57 The CMS WI offers a convenient method to capture 
geographic differences in labor costs and is calculated based on the labor costs for all 
short-term, acute care hospitals. However, the mix of labor costs underlying the CMS WI 
is likely more similar to general hospitals than SSHs or ASCs. Despite this difference, 
xlv More information about the AHRF can be found at: http://arf.hrsa.gov. 
xlvi The lag for the Medicaid eligible variable is likely due to the time required to collect 
data from the Medicaid programs of all 50 states and D.C., and develop the annual 
person-level file, Medicaid Analytic eXtract, which is the basis of this variable. Similarly, 
the licensed pharmacists variable is based on state licensure board data and requires the 
download and coordination of data from all states and D.C., except Hawaii and Alaska. 
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labor costs among all hospitals in a given health care market are likely similar enough to 
result in no measureable bias on the results. I also considered using the capital geographic 
adjustment factor (GAF) to assess differences in capital costs in each health care market; 
however, the capital GAF is calculated as a function of the WI and thus would provide no 
additional information to explain RHC location.xlvii In my analysis, I used the 2007 WI 
values, which are normalized to an average value of 1.0. 
To assess the relative tax burden on different states, I used the annual State 
Business Tax Climate Index (SBTCI), which is calculated by The Tax Foundation. The 
SBTCI is calculated at the state-level and is designed to assess the relative 
competitiveness in attracting new businesses and effectiveness at generating economic 
and employment growth for each state's tax system. The methodology incorporates the 
following taxes from each state: individual income, sales, corporate income, property, 
and unemployment insurance. I used the 2007 SBTCI values, which range from 0 to 10, 
. 1 . 56 m my ana ys1s. 
The American Health Planning Association conducts an annual survey of all 
states and the District of Columbia about CON laws and compiles the information in its 
National Directory of Certificate of Need Programs.78 I used a summary of the National 
Directory information for 2010 to identify two different state-based CON laws: one 
focused on the acute hospital beds and the other focused on ambulatory surgery centers. 
Twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia require CON for the development of 
xlvii The capital GAF is calculated as the WI raised to the power of 0.6825 for each MSA 
and non-MSA area. 
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new acute hospital beds, while 26 states and the District of Columbia require CON for 
development of ambulatory surgery centers. I analyzed state CON laws based on the 29 
states and the District of Columbia with at least one of these two CON laws present.xlviii 
The CMS provider of service file contains information about health care providers 
who participate in the Medicare and Medicaid programs.xlix I used the 2008 file to create 
a hospital HHI and an ASC HHI. The hospital HHI uses the number of hospital beds as 
the basis for estimating the market share of each hospital in a health care market. The 
ASC HHI assumes equal market share for each ASC in a health care market, and serves 
as a reasonable approximation of ASC market competition. Each HHI has a value of 
between 0 and 1, with 1 representing no market competition in a county, and index values 
near zero representing very high levels of market competition in a county. Table 3.2 
contains a summary of the variables included in the analysis. 
xlviii FL, MO, and NJ only require CON only for acute hospital beds, and MA and MT 
require CON only for ambulatory surgery centers. 
xlix More information about the CMS provider of service file can be found here: 
http://www .ems .gov /Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Downloadable-Public-Use-
Files/Provider-of-Services/index.htrnl 
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Table 3.2 Variables Analyzed by Data Source and Year 
Variable Description Variable Unit Year Assessed 
~.:.· ·: : '..... . . · .. ~~a·H~~~~~; R.~«iurc~}fii~~~ri~l>!~~-= · c6.ui~Yl!~!~ldata ... · · 2 :: · ., ':,. · : · 
Total Population Number in 1,000s 2007 
Population Growth Rate Percent 2002-2007 
Persons Eligible for Medicare FFS a Percent 2008 
Persons Enrolled in Medicare Advantage Percent 2008 
Persons Eligible for Medicaid Percent 2005 
Persons Less than 65 without Health Insurance Percent 2006 
Median Household Income Dollars in 1,000s 2007 
Total Active MDs Per 100,000 people 2007 
Number of Specialists b Per 100,000 people 2007 
Number of Acute Hospital Beds c Per 100,000 people 2007 
Number of Operating Rooms d Per 100,000 people 2007 
Number of Emergency Departments Per 100,000 people 2007 
1,··, :; ,.·· ·,,,;,y"':,~l;N1~\v;ag~ -,m~~~; .M$A:.,Ie~et"Mfarill~·:.;•·· ·: .·c \: · : : ;:.. . .,.: 
Wage Index Index value 2007 
1:• <' ... · :. , ,, '. .Cj) :~·', .. '.Y•. :·· .. 'f~~~~~d~ti~ri.·y~f!~l>l~:(St,ate~l~ye.lti~ta ·. · ·,.·: .. · . :·· .. :: .· . . ' ., c· 
State Business Tax Climate Index Index value [0- 10] 2007 
: < \,<,· >. .. -·, ,';;· . .'l.,a~~.~t!· }ttr~ati~ll. ~i~~IJie~; : s~~t~-J~veidata ~: ·.~ · ·· · .. : . 
Certificate of Need: Acute Hospital Beds or ASCs Yes I No 2010 
.•••••. , .<· ~,,T .... · ·, •. CMSP:t~Vid~r tit'StltviC'e' 'Fii~:· l'rbv:i4ef2tev~i'daia •••···•···· · .... · ;.. · , ,. ''.: ·. 
Hospital Bed HHl Index value [0- 1] 2008 
ASC HHl Index value [0 -1] 2008 
Notes: 
a Beneficiaries can become eligible to enroll in Medicare by reaching 65 years of age, called 
Aged enrollment, and can enroll in either Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) or in a private 
insurance plan through Medicare Advantage. I subtracted the number of Medicare Advantage 
enrollees from the total number of Medicare eligible persons to calculate the persons eligible 
for Medicare FFS. Both Medicare FFS and Medicare Advantage plans offer Medicare Part A, 
which covers inpatient hospital services, and Medicare Part B, which covers certain physician, 
outpatient hospital, laboratory and other services, and medical equipment and supplies. Most 
Medicare beneficiaries are enrolled in both Parts A and B. 
b The number of surgical specialists includes physicians with a general surgery, orthopedic 
surgery, or cardiovascular disease specialty. 
c The number of acute hospital beds includes all hospital beds in hospitals classified as either a 
short term general or short term non-general hospital. 
d The number of operating rooms includes the number of operating rooms in short term general 
hospitals and short term non-general hospitals. 
Methods 
I estimated an ordered logistic regression model to assess whether factors 
assessing the extent of the market, other information on state regulations, the relative 
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wage and tax costs, or hospital and ASC competition were associated with higher levels 
of hospital service specialization in a particular health care market.1 I defined hospital 
service specialization in each health care market in the 50 states and the District of 
Columbia to be one of three levels: '0' if no ASCs or SSHs were present, '1' if only one 
specialized hospital provider type (ASC or SSH) was present, and '2' when both 
specialized hospital provider types were present. I used counties as the definition of 
health care market for my analysis due to their small size and geographic basis, both of 
which are relevant for analyzing SSH and ASC markets. However, because this analysis 
1 The methodology and conceptual framework for this analysis is fundamentally similar 
to the analysis in Chapter 2, which addresses factors affecting RHC location. 
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may be dependent on the definition of a health care market, I conducted additional 
regressions using different definitions of a health care market: MSAs, and the Dartmouth 
Atlas' Hospital Service Areas (HSAs) and Hospital Referral Regions (HRRs). 
Each health care market definition uniquely identifies geographic areas by size 
and defining basis, and thus provides an assessment of the sensitivity of the results to 
these factors. Comparing regression results across market definitions can also identify 
differences in the results that may be attributed to the characteristics of each health care 
market definition. The United States contains 3,141 counties, which are relatively small, 
geographically defined areas.li MSAs are relatively large aggregations of counties and are 
defined based on population centers. Geographical analysis based on MSAs incorporates 
the 363 MSAs in the U.S. along with 48 non-MSA areas divided by state for a total of 
411 health care markets.1ii HSAs are relatively small areas of zip codes grouped by 
Medicare hospitalization patterns and are similar in size to counties. There are 3,434 
HSAs in the U.S.liii The 306 HRRs in the U.S. are relatively large aggregations of HSAs 
grouped by referral patterns for major cardiovascular surgical procedures and for 
neurosurgery. 
li There were 3,141 counties in the 2010 AHRF data file with population greater than 
zero. Newer versions of the AHRF contain 3,143 counties with population greater than 
zero. 
Iii There are only 48 states with non-MSA areas since D.C., RI, and NJ are classified 
entirely into MSAs. 
!iii Of the 3,436 HSAs in the country, 2 HSAs mapped primarily to the 2 counties in the 
2010 AHRF data file with a population of zero. 
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Before running regressions on each of the different health care market definitions, 
I matched each of the input datasets, which were based on zip code, county, MSA, and 
state-level data, to the geographic level of each market definition. To merge these 
datasets I used the zip code to HSA to HRR crosswalk created by the Dartmouth Atlas;58 
the county to MSA crosswalk for 2007 created by the Office of Management and 
Budget;59 and a mapping of zip codes to counties in the Statistical Analysis Software 
(SAS) system that uses each zip code's centroid to assign each zip code to the county.60 
I transformed the zip code-level SSH dataset to each of the health care market 
levels by using the crosswalks described above and creating a new variable identifying 
each market as having or lacking an SSH. The AHRF dataset contained county-level 
information, so I created county and MSA-level health care market variables directly 
from the county to MSA crosswalk. To create HSA-level variables, I used the mapping of 
zip codes to counties to identify a county-level value for each zip code in an HSA. Then I 
calculated the average county-level value across all zip codes in an HSA, and thus used 
the number of zip codes associated with each county as a weight in determining HSA-
level values of variables that cross county lines. I used the same method to create HRR-
level variables for the AHRF county-level variables. For MSA-level information in the 
CMS WI variables, I used the crosswalks described above to map each health care market 
to the MSA in which all or the majority of the market is located. Similarly, for the state-
level information, I used the crosswalks to map each health care market to the state in 
which all or the majority of the market is located. 
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To identify a set of independent logistic regression variables that were not 
collinear for each health care market regression, I started with the list of independent 
variables identified in Table 3.2, and ran a series of linear regressions for each health care 
market definition to identify and remove the independent variables that introduced 
collinearity in the model.liv When collinear variables were identified, I retained the 
independent variable that was likely to be the most important in determining SSH 
location in health care markets, and removed the other independent variable from the 
future runs of the linear regression model. For all health care market definitions, the 
results from the first linear regression showed that Total Active MDs and Number of 
Specialists each had a proportion of variation larger than 0.80 for the eigenvector with the 
largest condition index, while all other independent variables had a proportion of 
variation less than 0.50.1v·61 Because my conceptual framework identifies the Number of 
Specialists as having more influence over hospital specialization than Total Active MDs, I 
removed Total Active MDs from the analysis. I then ran a new linear regression with the 
remaining independent variables and found that there were no additional collinear 
liv The first regression for each health care market included all variables listed in Table 
3 .2. Using the results of that regression, I identified the two variables with the largest 
degree of collinearity based on the condition index. Specifically, I identified the two 
parameters with a proportion of variation that was 0.50 or larger for the eigenvector with 
the largest condition index. 
Iv The condition index is the square root of the ratio of the largest eigenvalue to each 
individual eigenvalue. Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980) suggest that dependencies 
among the regression independent variables (collinearity) may affect the parameter 
estimates at a condition index of 10 or more. The variance inflation factor, which I only 
used as additional information when identifying variables with the highest degree if 
collinearity, is an index that measures how much the variance of each parameter estimate 
is inflated due to collinearity among the regression independent variables. 
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parameters based on two criteria for the eigenvector with the largest condition index: the 
condition index was less than 10, and only one parameter had a proportion of variation 
larger than 0.50. 
Given that the process for removing collinear variables was identical for each of 
the health care market definitions, I believe the geographic regression models should be 
fairly robust and expect any differences in results by health care market to be attributed to 
differences in the characteristics of each health care market definition. 
For each health care market definition, I ran an ordered logistic regression 
including only the independent variables that remained after the collinear parameter 
removal process described above. The dependent variable for each health care market 
definition is the level of hospital services specialization: no ASCs or SSHs present; at 
least one ASC or at least one SSH present; both ASCs and SSHs present. I analyzed 
counties as the primary health care market definition because the small size of the market 
allows for more specificity in the results than the larger health care market definitions, 
and the underlying data corresponds most closely with counties. In the next section, I 
present the cumulative parameter estimates for each independent variable for the county 
health care market ordered logistic regression and identify the factors that were 
significantly associated with higher levels of hospital service specialization. To explain 
the relative strength of association of hospital service specialization with each factor in 
the model, I calculated the change in level of hospital service specialization in a county 
health care market associated with the change from the 25th to 75th percentile for each 
continuous independent variable, with the change from a "No" to a "Yes" value for each 
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binary independent variable, and with a change from the mean level of competition to no 
competition for the HHI variables. Finally, I present the odds ratios for each independent 
variable in the ordered logistic regressions for each of the four different health care 
market definitions. 
Results 
The 140 SSHs in the analysis were distributed among 81 of the 3,141 counties in 
the U.S. and the 4,937 ASCs were distributed among 877 counties. Table 3.3 describes 
the level of hospital service specialization in county health care markets. 
Table 3.3 Level of Hospital Service Specialization in County Health Care Markets 
Level of Hospital Service Specialization: 0 1 2 
Number of Counties: 2,257 810 74 
Table 3.4 shows the results of the ordered logistic regression assessing the 
association of each factor with higher levels of hospital service specialization in county 
health care markets. This regression has a c-statistic of 0.946 indicating a very strong 
concordance, or a high degree of accuracy in the model's ability to predict the outcome 
variable. For each independent variable in the logistic regression, Table 3.4 shows the 
cumulative parameter estimate and p-value resulting from the regression as well as the 
unit of measurement, median value (or mean value for binary variables), and standard 
deviation of each independent variable among county health care markets. Factors 
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exhibiting a significant association with higher levels of hospital service specialization at 
the five percent level are shaded in the table such that independent variables that had a 
positive association are shaded dark grey and independent variables that had a negative 
association are shaded in light grey. Non-shaded independent variables did not have a 
significant association with hospital service specialization in county health care markets. 
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Table 3.4 Parameter Estimates of Factors Associated with Hospital Service Specialization 
in County Markets a 
Independent Variable Unit of Median I Standard Measurement Mean b Deviation 
Parameter 
Estimate P-Value 
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Notes: 
a Dark shaded cells indicate positive association and light shaded cells indicate negative association at 
the 5 % level of significance between each factor and higher levels of hospital service specialization in 
county health care markets. Non-shaded cells are not significantly associated with hospital service 
specialization in county health care markets. 
b Value shows the proportion of counties with a "Yes" value for binary (Yes I No) independent variables. 
Table 3.4 shows that 10 factors of the 16 included in the final logistic model have 
a significant positive or negative association with the level of hospital service 
specialization in a county health care market. The population-based demand factors 
showed that hospital service specialization in a county was significantly associated with a 
larger population growth rate, but a smaller proportion of the population eligible for 
Medicare fee-for-service (FFS), enrolled in Medicare Advantage, or without health 
insurance for persons under 65. Hospital service specialization was not associated with 
the proportion of Medicaid eligible persons or the median household income. Of the 
factors associated with the supply of specialized hospital services, hospital service 
specialization was associated with a greater number of specialists and operating rooms 
per capita, but a smaller number of emergency departments per capita. The number of 
acute hospital beds was not significantly associated with hospital service specialization. 
Finally, hospital service specialization was significantly associated with the absence of a 
state CON law for either acute hospital beds or ambulatory surgery centers as well as 
higher levels of hospital competition and ASC competition. Hospital service 
specialization was not associated with the state business tax climate index or the wage 
index. 
102 
Table 3.5 shows the marginal probability of each independent variable, or the 
change in level of hospital service specialization in a county associated with the change 
of a particular independent variable, when all other independent variables are held 
constant at their median value or mean value for binary independent variables and HHI 
indices. For continuous independent variables, the change in probability is from the 25th 
percentile to the 75th percentile of all county values. For binary independent variables, 
the change in probability represents a switch from "No" to "Yes" value for the variable. 
For the HHI indices, the change in probability is from the mean competition index value 
to an index value of 1, representing no competition. 
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Table 3.5 Hospital service specialization marginal probability for each factor a 
Independent Variable 
Total Population 
Unit of 
Measurement 
1,000 people 
Median/ 
Meanb 
25.38 
Marginal 
Probability c 
0.001 
% ofMean 
RHCProb. ct 
0.61 % 
Notes: 
a Dark shaded cells indicate positive association and light shaded cells indicate negative association at 
the 5 % level of significance between each factor and higher levels of hospital service specialization in 
county health care markets. Non-shaded cells are not significantly associated with hospital service 
specialization in county health care markets. 
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b Value shows the proportion of counties with a "Yes" value for binary (Yes I No) independent variables. 
c For binary independent variables, the marginal probability represents the change in level of hospital 
service specialization associated with a switch from "No" to "Yes" value for the variable. For continuous 
independent variables, the marginal probability represents the change in level of hospital service 
specialization associated with a change from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile of all county 
values. For the HHI indices, the change in probability is from the mean competition index value to an 
index value of 1. 
d The percent of mean level of hospital service specialization is the percent marginal probability for each 
independent variable of the mean probability of hospital service specialization across all counties: 
marginal probability I 0.305. 
The marginal probability analysis shows that the population demand and provider 
supply characteristics had a fairly strong association with the level of hospital service 
specialization in a county. Increasing the population growth rate of a county from the 
25th to 75th percentiles increased the level of hospital service specialization by 26.89 
percent. However, increasing the proportion of the population eligible for Medicare FFS, 
enrolled in Medicare Advantage, or younger than 65 without health insurance showed a 
decrease in level of specialization (-23.66, -18.24, and -27.76 percent, respectively). 
Increasing the number of specialists and operating rooms per capita showed 
similar size increases in the level of hospital specialization: 22.64 and 33.69 percent, 
respectively; however, an increase in the number of emergency departments per capita 
showed a large decrease ( -58.20 percent) in the level of hospital service specialization. 
Switching the CON status for acute hospital beds or ambulatory surgery centers from 
"No" to "Yes" showed a strong decrease in the level of hospital service specialization (-
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71.77 percent). Finally, decreasing hospital and ASC competition from mean HHI levels 
to no competition also decreased levels of hospital service specialization by 18.73 and 
60.82 percent, respectively. 
Counties provide a reasonable basis for health care market definition when 
assessing factors associated with the level of hospital service specialization. At the same 
time, analyzing these associations for MSA, HSA, and HRR health care market 
definitions may help determine the extent to which the resulting associations depends on 
health care market definitions. Table 3.6 shows the odds ratios and 95 percent confidence 
intervals for all independent variables for all four health care market definitions, with 
significantly positive associations shaded in dark grey and significantly negative 
associations shaded in light grey. 
In general, the analysis of the level of hospital service specialization appears to be 
better measured by smaller health care market definitions. The c-statistics for the county 
and HSA analyses are larger than for the MSA and HRR analyses, and the distribution of 
health care markets across levels of hospital service specialization (both SSHs and ASCs, 
SSHs or ASCs, or no SSHs or ASCs) also shows some distortion when the data are 
aggregated to MSA or HRR health care markets. 
Because the underlying data-based on counties, MSAs, or states-corresponds 
perfectly to county boundaries, I would expect the county analysis to produce more 
accurate results compared to other market definitions. Yet, in running the HSA analysis, I 
identified a few inconsistencies. The first difference from the county market analysis 
shows that a higher population is associated with hospital service specialization for HSA 
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markets. One of the more striking inconsistencies is the negative association between 
hospital service specialization and both a higher proportion of Medicaid eligible adults 
and a lower household income. These socioeconomic-related results may have offset any 
relationship between hospital service specialization and the proportion of the population 
without health insurance, which was not significant in HSA markets. Finally, significant 
associations were found, but split in direction for the tax and wage indices in HSA 
markets. Neither of these factors had a significant association for county markets. 
Although there were some differences in results across health care market 
definitions, hospital service specialization was found to be significantly associated in 
both county and HSA health care markets with population growth rate, proportion of 
persons eligible for Medicare FFS, Medicare Advantage enrollees, number of specialists 
and operating rooms per capita, number of emergency departments per capita, the lack of 
CON laws for either acute hospital beds or ambulatory surgery centers, and higher levels 
of competition in both hospital and ASC markets. Both the c-statistics and consistency in 
results for smaller health care markets support my conclusion that the county-based 
analysis provide the most accurate results. 
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Limitations and Notes 
The majority of independent variables are based on county, MSA, and state-level 
information, and thus have geographic boundaries that align perfectly with county and 
most MSA health care markets. However, HSAs and HRRs are based on zip codes and 
thus cross county, MSA, and state boundaries. As a result, analyses of HSA and HRR 
health care markets lack the level of precision of analyses based on county or MSA 
health care markets. 
Due to the aggregation of data into the larger MSA or HRR health care markets, 
very few markets were identified to have no SSHs and no ASCs. Therefore, the results 
from the ordered logistic regressions based on MSA and HRR health care markets lack 
precision in differentiating between levels of hospital service specialization across health 
care markets. None of the major findings of this study depends on results from MSA or 
HRR analyses. 
Discussion and Future Research 
Becker and Murphy's model of specialization, based on coordination costs, the 
size of the market, and the amount of knowledge among the workers in the market offers 
a helpful framework for interpreting the results of this paper. The amount of knowledge 
among surgical specialists is shared nationally through licensure, professional 
organizations, and journals, and therefore is not likely to have a differential impact on a 
single geographic market. However, coordination costs and the size of the market have 
implications for the degree of specialization in individual health care markets. 
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As discussed in the framework section, certain coordination costs are evident, and 
have resulted in some limitations on the degree of specialization in the market. Some 
mechanisms of coordination cost are not measurable empirically, yet limitations 
addressing perceived coordination costs have been set through regulations requiring 
approval before developing new hospital beds or ASCs, and through laws capping 
physician-ownership of SSHs. This analysis found that even with coordination costs 
present, several factors measuring the size of the market had a significant association 
with the degree of specialization in the hospital services market, and thus suggest that 
market size factors also enforce some limitations on the degree of specialization. 
Demand factors that support a higher degree of hospital service specialization 
include a higher population growth rate and a larger proportion of the population with 
private health insurance; the latter association was inferred through results based on the 
proportion of the population with Medicare, Medicaid, and no health insurance. These 
demand results can be expected: growing populations of people with sufficient insurance 
generate the demand for specialized hospital services. 
Provider supply factors associated with a higher degree of hospital services 
include higher per capita number of specialists and operating rooms, which may allow for 
more capacity to be dedicated to smaller set of more specialized services. The fact that a 
higher degree of hospital service specialization is associated with fewer emergency 
departments per capita is likely due to the tendency for SSHs and ASCs to not provide 
emergency services. 
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The requirement to seek approval by a state health planning agency before 
increasing the number of acute hospital beds or developing a new ASC has a clear 
negative influence on the specialization of hospital services through SSHs and ASCs. It is 
evident in the underlying data for SSHs as only three are located in states with acute 
hospital bed CON laws.1vi The existence of CON laws shows that coordination costs are 
present in specialized markets. In response to GAO's 2003 report on specialty hospital 
location, officials from both the American Surgical Hospital Association, now Physician 
Hospitals of America, and a specialty hospital chain, MedCath Corporation, !vii indicated 
that they consider communities' future health care needs when choosing potential 
locations for new SSHs and tend to locate in areas experiencing high population 
growth.77 While the focus of individual SSHs is on community needs, market regulators 
in many states believe additional regulation is necessary to coordinate the supply of 
hospital services. 
Finally, higher levels of hospital and ASC competition are also associated with 
higher levels of hospital service specialization. These associations are statistically 
significant for nearly all health care market definitions. While this analysis does not 
determine whether coordination costs are a more limiting factor on the degree of 
specialization in a market than the size of the market, it does provide a framework for 
understanding the sources of limitations on specialization that have led to some recent 
!vi MI, NC, and NV have a CON law for acute hospital beds and each have one 
orthopedic/surgical SSH. 
!vii MedCath Corporation operated several cardiac SSHs starting in 1999 and maintained 
significant focus on SSHs through 2005. MedCath was sold in 2011. 
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developments in the market for hospital services. With some limits on the degree of 
specialization, certain markets have many specialists of the same type. In such market 
competition, specialists are likely to differentiate themselves by competing on a quality 
basis rather than by scope of service. SSHs compete on this basis by claiming to provide 
higher quality of care, while also expanding their competition basis by offering additional 
amenities and focusing on hospitality and atmosphere. 
Health care spending varies geographically after accounting for differences in 
case mix and the cost of conducting business. The degree of specialization is potential 
source of this variation that deserves future attention. In markets with high levels of 
hospital specialization, patients have multiple options for inpatient and outpatient surgery 
providers. These patients likely see more providers for their health care on average, 
increasing the potential for communication disruptions and duplicate diagnostic, 
laboratory test, or other physician procedures. By applying the levels of hospital service 
specialization defined in this chapter to data for Medicare FFS beneficiaries, I found that 
per beneficiary numbers of evaluation and management visits, imaging procedures, 
laboratory tests, and other physician procedures were associated with higher levels of 
hospital service specialization.79 Although there are several factors that may confound 
this association, further research about the role of market size and coordination costs may 
provide a better understanding about efficient levels of specialization. 
In the market for all health care services, recent developments have focused on 
ways to coordinate many types of providers by aligning incentives and coordination 
costs. HMOs and ACOs are good examples of such vertical integration that seeks to limit 
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the cost of the organization of specialists through markets. These new organizational 
forms of health care delivery continue to develop, bringing both improvements as well as 
externalities to health care markets. This chapter helps to provide a context for assessing 
the sources of limits on specialization in health care delivery and can provide an initial 
step toward future analysis. Both the extent of the market and coordination costs seem to 
limit the degree of specialization in hospital services, but additional research in this 
framework can provide insight into further identifying efficient degrees of specialization. 
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